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ARTICLES
CULPABILITY AND COMMONSENSE JUSTICE:




Three criminal law domains - accessory felony-murder,
insanity, and manslaughter - serve as the grounds for contrast-
ing two perspectives on "culpability" - that of "black-letter law"
and "commonsense justice." Of the two, black-letter law is
clearer, for it has been codified in statutes, clarified in rulings,
pronounced in dicta, and patterned in jury instructions. Less
clear is "commonsense justice": as used here, that term signifies
those fundamental views that ordinary citizens hold about what is
fair and just, what is blameworthy, and what is not.' In regard to
commonsense justice's positions, those must be gleaned empiri-
cally, from objective indicia.
The reader, either a novice or seasoned veteran, might pose
an immediate question: Why bother with "commonsense jus-
tice," if black-letter law is the one and only law pertinent to a case at
bar? Put another way, why not simply rule "commonsense jus-
tice" irrelevant and out of bounds? Some answers must be
offered.
The first answer is a realist's response: the irrelevant ruling
simply will not hold, as commonsense justice refuses to stay out
of bounds. As archival findings suggest' and experimental
results show,3 jurors bring their perspectives on culpability to the
jury box, and when those views conflict with the law's position,
* Professor of Psychology, Georgetown University
1. See NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTIcE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE
LAw (1995).
2. See, e.g., THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIALJuRY, 1200-1800 (1985); VALERI
P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1986).
3. See, e.g., Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effect of Juty Nullification Instruction on
Verdicts and Jury Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 25 (1985);
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jury nullification,4 reconstruing of instructions,5 and the intru-
sion of "extralegal" factors6 may result. This first, pragmatic
point warns that ignoring this perspective courts a jury decision
making process and a verdict outcome that black-letter law may
never have intended.
The second point cuts more deeply, striking at foundational
matters. When Sophocles staged Antigone,7 and when Shake-
speare did Measure for Measure two thousand years later, both
Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact ofJudicial Instructions, Arguments,
and Challenges on Juy Decision Making, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1988).
4. Irwin A. Horowitz & Thomas E. Willging, Changing Views ofJuy Power:
The Nullification Debate, 1787-1988, 15 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 165 (1991). 'Jury
nullification" is the term given to the phenomenon whereby jurors bring in a
"not guilty" verdict despite the prosecution's proving all elements of the charge;
thus, the jury nullifies the conviction. Nullifications have been suspected, and
even argued for within the trial, in the Colonial trial of John Peter Zenger
(1735), the Quaker trial of William Penn and William Mead (1670), and the
Interregnum trial of John Lilburne (1649), an opponent of Cromwell. See
Green, supra note 2; Hans & Vidmar, supra note 2.
5. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND
THE LAw ON TRI-A (1988) (discussing how "intent to commit murder," the
malice aforethought," was reconstrued by the jury in a way that moved those
terms from the legal definition toward a motivational and commonsense
meaning); see also Norman J. Finkel et al., Competency, and Other Constructs, in
Right to Die Cases, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 135 (1993); NormanJ. Finkel et al.,
Right to Die, Euthanasia, and Community Sentiment: Crossing the Public/Private
Boundary, 17 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 487 (1993) (in these two articles, mock jurors
reconstrue legal terms such as "malice" and "murder," and reconstrue medical/
legal terms, such as "terminal," "irreversible," and "pain," in ways that doctors
and courts typically do not consider, but ordinary people do).
6. HARRY H. KALVEN, JR. & HANS H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1971);
Christy A. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 11 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1987). "Extra-legal" factors are those that should not be
relevant to weighing the guilt or innocence of the defendant; these are factors
not sanctioned by the court, and ajudge may warn against the intrusion of such
in instructions to the jury. Deciding guilt on the basis of race, gender, income,
attractiveness, etc., would clearly involve impermissible extra-legal factors. But
other extra-legal factors, such as the "justice notions" of ordinary citizens,
whether they think the law is silly or too punitive or whether they think the case
is frivolous, are less clearly out of bounds.
7. Sophocles, Antigone, in 1 GREEK TRAGEDIES (David Grene & Rishmond
Law Lattimore eds., 1991); see also Daniel N. Robinson, A Critical Study of Natural
Law Theory: Contemporary Essays, 45 REv. METAPHYSICS 363 (1991). Antigone
sought to bury her slain brother, but the king, her "uncle" Creon, had issued a
decree forbidding the burial. The law made it a crime, but Antigone
deliberately broke the law. Her appeal, so to speak, was to "the gods' unwritten
and unfailing laws," a higher law; given that this play has had a more than two-
thousand year run, Antigone's "nullification pitch" must have struck a
sympathetic chord in audiences.
8. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE (Brian Gibbons ed.,
1991). In this play involving law, justice, and extremes, Vienna has gone to seed
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dramatists, legal "outsiders" to be sure, played out the dangers
for law and society when laws failed to accord with the deeper
sense of justice. Some "insiders" have delivered that message as
well: judges,9 justices,1" commentators,"l and researchers 12 have
all noted that the law, for it to be respected and obeyed, must be
grounded closely to the common ground. Unlike point one,
where the danger is that a "wrongful verdict" might result, or
where the jury decision making process may be confounded and
flawed, point two goes beyond a particular case to the danger for
law itself.
The third point notes that there are places where the law
not only does not silence commonsense justice, but summons it
to speak. The obvious place is in death penalty adjudication,
where the jury - the "conscience of the community" - typically
renders the life or death decision."3 Far from out of bounds,
community sentiment is front and center, as it legitimates this
final act. Though less visible than a jury's decision, "community
sentiment" plays a central if not dispositive role in Eighth
under the permissive rules of Duke Vincentio, with debauchery and corruption
rampant. The Duke deliberately departs and appoints Angelo as his
replacement, who wields the law in strict and authoritarian ways, where
measure for measure - the unyielding letter of the law - leads not to justice.
Shakespeare argues, through this play, for law working best when it is tempered
by a humane and expansive spirit; put in current terms, for the intrusion of
certain "extra-legal" factors.
9. E.g., DAVID L. BAZELON, QUESTIONING AUTHORITY: JUSTICE AND
CRIMINAL LAW (1988).
10. E.g., OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881); see also
Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354 (1992). Justice Blackmun, writing
for the Court, states, "Public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice
system is essential for preserving community peace in trials involving race-
related crimes." To allow exclusion of groups from the jury "could only
undermine the very foundation of our system of justice - our citizens'
confidence in it." But seeJustice Scalia's short, but stinging, dissent, id. at 2364.
See also Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2799 (1992).
Here, the Court again talks about the country's loss of confidence in the
Judiciary. But injustice Scalia's dissent, he writes, "I cannot agree with, indeed
I am appalled by, the Court's suggestion that the decision whether to stand by
an erroneous constitutional decision must be stongly influenced - against
overruling, no less - by the substantial and continuing public opposition the
decision has generated." Id at 2883 (emphasis added).
11. E.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); MICHAEL L. PIRIN, THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE, (1994); Roscoe Pound, The Need of a
Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607 (1907).
12. E.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
13. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
241 (1972).
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Amendment cases,1 4 where the issue is whether a punishment is
"cruel and unusual." 5 When black-letter law admits community
sentiment to adjudicate these punishing dilemmas, it also admits
that "law" alone does not preempt the legal discourse. Thus,
whether avowed or unconscious,6 invited or not, this common-
sense perspective is in mind, and in court.
In this article, the common ground is brought to light not by
divination, or even opinion poll responses to general questions,
but by giving "mock jurors" specific cases with specific fact pat-
terns, where key variables are manipulated. From experimental
methods, cause and effect relationships between culpability vari-
ables and jurors' verdict and sentencing decisions can be
found. 7 From these relationships, the outline of the jurors' per-
spective emerges. And when jurors' reasons' 8 for their decisions
are analyzed - the why they do what they do - an even richer
picture emerges.
14. E.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263 (1980); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349 (1910).
15. This is not the only area of law, of course, where community
sentiment weighs heavily. In obscenity law, for example, the community's
standards play a significant part in the judgment, although gauging that
standard has been done in almost cavalier, rather than empirical, fashion.
Judges and prosecutors, through some direct knowing or divination, have
claimed that they knew what those standards were. See Daniel Linz et al.,
Discrepancies between the Legal Code and Community Standards for Sex and Violence:
An Empirical Challenge to Traditional Assumptions in Obscenity Law, 29 LAw & Soc'v
Rxv. 127 (1995). In Fourth Amendment cases involving search and seizure and
reasonable expectations of privacy, the community's reasonable expectations
come into play. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look
at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society", 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993).
16. HOLMES, supra note 10, at 1 (stating that "intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their
fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining
the rules by which men should be governed").
17. See Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to
Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 193, 204 (1995) (stating that "[t]he best
type of research is a true experiment").
18. I have argued that reasons must be fathomed as well as verdicts, to
complete the picture: not just whatjurors do, but why they do what they do. See,
e.g., Norman J. Finkel, Capital Felony-Murder, Objective Indicia, and Community
Sentiment, 32 ARIz. L. REv. 819 (1990); NormanJ. Finkel, De Facto Departures From
Insanity Instructions: Toward the Remaking of Common Law, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
105 (1990). Such an approach moves the methodology from the strict
experiment, to something broader, which now includes more narrative and
discursive analyses. E.g., ROM HARRIt & GRANT GILLETT, THE DIsCURslVE MIND
(1994).
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This article tells the story of those findings, a story that is
consistent across domains, and can be summarized this way:. citi-
zens see greater nuance and gradations to culpability, and make
finer distinctions, than black-letter law either sees or sanctions.
In addition, jurors' culpability judgments emerge from a highly
contextualized, psychological matrix, where the law's matrix
turns out to be simplistic, by comparison. Further, those tradi-
tional elements - mens rea, mens, and intention - loom large
and are judged more subjectively, rather than objectively, or by
doctrinal rules. However, while jurors bend in the subjective
direction in judging culpability, they do not go as far as the law's
unrestrained plunge into subjectivity, 9 as in the Model Penal
Code's concept of "extreme emotional disturbance." 0 Thus,
objective anchors to reality remain important to jurors, even if
they are being jettisoned by black-letter law. Looking across
domains, these commonsense distinctions align quite closely with
venerated legal principles and reliable psychological findings,
even when the law strays from those principles and ignores those
facts.
It is no accident that I pick accessory felony-murder,
insanity, and manslaughter as the three criminal law domains
under scrutiny. Each has been rife with controversy, with ten-
sions of the past remaining alive today. There remains, for each
domain, a suspicion that the law may be out of tune with commu-
nity sentiment.2" And another reason for picking these three
relates to culpability: these domains represent distinct positions
along a culpability continuum. If we take the verdicts of guilty of
accessory felony-murder, guilty of manslaughter, and not guilty
by reason of insanity, two of these verdicts would fall at the
extremes, while the other occupies a midpoint on the
continuum.
Black-letter law's position, while clear, is far from cogent.
The doctrine that sustains accessory felony-murder has been
called "a living fossil"22 - yet it still leaves the Supreme Court
divided, while exposing some to the death penalty who do not
have the level of culpability that is traditionally required. In
insanity jurisprudence, where each new "wrongful" verdict seems
to trigger judges and legislators to "change the test," this strategy
19. See Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I - Prococation,
Emotional Disturbance, and the Model Penal Code, 27 B.C. L. REv. 243 (1986).
20. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1) (b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
[hereinafter MPC].
21. See supra note 18 (suspicions regarding insanity, and felony-murder,
being out of tune); see Singer, supra note 19 (regarding manslaughter).
22. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 159 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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finds the law chasing the tail of symptoms,2" travelling in cir-
cles,24 and making law in the absence of evidence.2" And in the
curious history of manslaughter, where objective rules and an
"average man" exemplar were first fashioned, the law then did a
subjective flip-flop, plunging into the dark interior where culpa-
bility is now tied to an outmoded mental entity. If the law finds
itself lost in a labyrinth, then perhaps commonsensejustice, with
its views on culpability, can show the way out.
In Part II, at one extreme on a culpability continuum, acces-
sory felony-murder is examined. Here, a guilty verdict signifies
great culpability, as such defendants may receive the death pen-
alty.26 Yet, despite the highest level of culpability that attaches,
the traditional assessment of intent (mens rea) becomes muted
and moot, as doctrinal rules dictate outcomes. The "intent" to
kill matters not, as the felony-murder doctrine dictates that if one
intended to commit the underlying felony and a death occurred
during the commission of a felony, then one is guilty of murder.
By the accessorial liability doctrine, accessories are judged
equally guilty with the triggerman, and with each other, as these
now fungible defendants get equal punishment.
Jurors are left with an unenviable two-choice option: find-
ing such defendants Not Guilty, or Guilty of Felony-Murder,27
even though premeditation and deliberation are absent.
Though jurors see culpability distinctions among perpetrators,
the law permits no gradations. The law's "equalism" is problem-
atic not only for jurors, but for the law, as it seems to fly in the
face of individual and proportional justice - where each
defendant's culpability is assessed according to that defendant's
blameworthiness.
In Part III, we move to the other end on the culpability con-
tinuum, insanity. An NGRI verdict is a finding of nonculpability,
23. BAZELON, supra note 9.
24. NORMANJ. FINKEL, INSANrrY ON TRIAL (1988).
25. PERLIN, supra note 11; Norman J. Finkel & Solomon M. Fulero,
Insanity: Making Law in the Absence of Evidence, 11 INT'L J. MED. & L. 383 (1992).
26. In Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), there were 32 states and
jurisdictions where the death penalty could follow felony-murder depending
upon the level of participation, the level of culpability, or who dies (e.g., police
officer) during the death. In Tison, 481 U.S. 137, there were 34 jurisdictions.
27. One can argue that a lesser offense charge can be given. But can
jurors select such an option without nullifying the instructions? Ifjurors follow
the conclusive presumption that if the defendant intended to commit the
underlying felony, and if a death occurred during the commision of that felony,
then the logic, "if A, and if B, then guilty of felony-murder," must follow, like a
syllogistic conclusion. Only by defying the instructions, or reconstruing them,
can a third option result.
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and it exculpates. Linking the extremes of felony-murder and
insanity is the fact that the law presents jurors with an "all-or-
none" choice in insanity cases as well. 8 While the two choices
have remained constant for nearly three centuries, the test defi-
nition of insanity has repeatedly changed, as it did again after
United States v. Hinckley.2" Yet the empirics will show that while
jurors discriminate, the test instructions neither yield discrimina-
ble verdicts, nor get jurors to think along different construct
dimensions; thus changing the test has been much ado about
nothing. Empirics also show thatjurors' constructs of insanity are
powerfully determinative of verdict, and these constructs reveal
greater shadings to culpability, in type and degree, than those
embedded in the legally sanctioned tests. Thus the law's two-
choice format misfits jurors' judgments of culpability. This is
more than black-letter law and commonsense justice out of tune,
for the argument also asserts that law is in conflict with itself.
In Part IV, I summarize some recent work in the area of
manslaughter, where the law has recognized mitigation for cen-
turies. Here, jurors have a lesser offense category betwixt mur-
der and not guilty to register an in-between culpable judgment.
Experimental findings will show that the commonsense justice
perspective is highly nuanced, revealing a "psychological theory"
- of provocation, passion, thinking, control, and cooling off
time, and how they interrelate - that is more complex and
more in line with psychological findings than the law's theory.
This commonsense theory is more ideographic and subjective
than the objective law and its prototypical "average person"
exemplar; it is also more objectively grounded and demanding
than the MPC's "extreme emotional disturbance."
In Part V, I conclude that the consistency belongs to com-
monsense justice, and not the law. When we sum across the
areas, commonsense justice reveals some reliable principles
about culpability. These principles are neither nonsensical nor
superficial: to the contrary, they are grounded in moral and psy-
chological concerns about culpability, and they invoke enduring
principles of justice that the law's path has strayed from. Under-
standing the path of commonsense justice offers at least two
rewards: it may bring the law closer to its citizens, and it may
bring the law back to its most enduring principles.
28. For a seventeenth century exception, see SIR GEORGE MACKENZIE, THE
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF SCOTLAND IN MATTERS CRIMINAL (1678).
29. 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981); Insanity Defense Reform Act
(IDRA), Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 401-02, 20, 98 Stat. 1837, 2057 (1984).
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II. ACCESSORY FELONY-MURDER, OR MURTHER MOST FOUL
The people of Denmark, including the Prince, thought it
was an accident: a serpent stung the sleeping King, making his
"sleep" permanent. But when his father's Ghost tells Hamlet that
it was a "foul and most unnatural murther,"3" Hamlet is caught
by surprise. Now consider D's surprise.
D enters a liquor store with a loaded (or unloaded) gun,
intending to commit a robbery," l but something goes wrong; the
storekeeper, at the sight of the gun, has a heart attack and dies.32
D, as if stung by a serpent, is charged with first degree murder,
called felony-murder. "But this most foul, strange, and unnatu-
ral"3" murder gets only stranger.
Now consider these variations where the storekeeper again
dies: D's loaded gun accidentally discharges; the storekeeper
grabs at D's gun and the gun discharges; the storekeeper grabs
his own gun and shoots himself as he tries to fire at the fleeing D;
or a police officer, arriving at the scene, accidentally shoots the
storekeeper while aiming at D. While these diverse but by no
means exhaustive variations go off in improbable directions, the
"bottom line" remains constant and certain: the crime is always
felony-murder. In Hamlet, a supposed accident is revealed as pre-
meditated murder, by a snake of a different sort. Here, in felony-
murder, where there is no premeditation but an unintended
death, there is nonetheless murder.
A. The Law's Conflict... with Itself
Such cases become "murder" through the felony-murder
rule, which holds that if in the course of certain felonies34 a
death occurs, even an unintended death, then the crime is fel-
ony-murder. But where is the mens rea for murder? We know
30. WInLtAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK,
act 1, sc. 5, lines 25-26.
31. Norman J. Finkel & Kevin B. Duff, Felony-Murder and Community
Sentiment: Testing the Supreme Court's Assertions, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 405, 405
(1991).
32. Something akin to this hypothetical occurs in People v. Stamp, 82
Cal. Rptr. 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
33. SHAKEsPEARE, supra note 30, at line 28.
34. Finkel, Capital Felony Murder, Objective Indicia, and Community Sentiment,
supra note 18, at 820 n.10 (many states limit felony-murder to certain
enumerated felonies, typically the violent felonies); MPC, supra note 20,
§ 210.2(1)(b) (the MPC, for example, states that "the commission of, or an
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery,
rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary,
kidnapping, or felonious escape," are the enumerated felonies).
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that D intended to rob the liquor store, but he did not intend to
murder. How do we convict for murder without the intent?
Three answers have been put forth. 5 The least satisfactory
answer claims that mens rea is unnecessary for felony-murder, as
the crime is simply a strict liability offense. But as Professor Hart
notes, strict liability offenses are "generally viewed with great
odium," 6 since they sever "the required connection between cul-
pability and criminal liability."37 Thus, this strict liability answer
bypasses culpability altogether, creating an expedient that seems
to fly in the face of fairness principles.3"
The other two justifications for felony-murder deal with
intent, either by transferring or constructing it.39 In the "trans-
ferred intent" view - which has been criticized as having "no
proper place in criminal law"' - the mental state required for
the underlying felony (e.g., robbery) substitutes for the mental
state required for the homicide. But there are differences
between intent to kill and intent to rob, as they diverge in legal,
conceptual, and pragmatic ways. If, by this transfer, "intent" is
finessed and becomes a given, and we couple this with an uncon-
troverted death, then guilt on the felony-murder charge is
beyond reproof.
Under the third view of "constructive malice,"41 we presume
the malice for the homicide from the mental state required for
the commission of the underlying felony. This is an elastic, "one
size fits all" notion, where a generic malice is stretched to cover
all particulars. But the stretch doesn't work: the malice to com-
mit a robbery, or even a generic malice, whatever that is, may be
quite removed from the intent to commit murder.
The felony-murder rule - supported by unsupportable jus-
tifications that either deny, finesse, or elasticize intent - ends
up manufacturing murder. Once alleged, its proof is almost as
certain as gravity, for the scales of justice flop toward "guilty"
without culpability ever being weighed. The crime then leads to
a punishment that may be disproportionate to the offense, and
35. Finkel, Capital Felony Murder, Objective Indicia, and Community Sentiment,
supra note 18, at 820 n.9.
36. H.LA. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY. ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 20 (1984).
37. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 303 (1978).
38. See People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965) (The court
noted criticism that this rule "erodes the relation between criminal liability and
moral culpability.").
39. Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CONELL L. REv. 446, 454 (1985).
40. ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 921 (1982).
41. Roth & Sundby, supra note 39.
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may therefore be cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amend-
ment. One empirical question is: Does this crime and punish-
ment fit with commonsense justice's notions?
Let us compound the basic felony-murder scenario by giving
our triggerman D some accessories, all of whom are in on the
robbery attempt: C will be the "sidekick," who enters the liquor
store with D, but who does not fire a gun; B will be the "lookout,"
stationed outside the liquor store to warn his fellow conspirators
if danger approaches; and A will be the "getaway driver," sitting
behind the wheel across the street. We know that when the store-
keeper dies, D's crime escalates from armed robbery to felony-
murder. Now, through the accessorial liability rule, involving
another transfer, the triggerman's culpability is transferred undi-
minished to all the accessories. Thus, A, B, and C face felony-mur-
der charges as well.
Am I my brother's keeper? The biblical answer to Cain was
"yes." The legal answer, to brothers-in-crime A, B, and C is "yes,
and then some." In the eyes of the law, these brothers-in-crime
become fungible clones. The union of accessorial liability and
felony-murder rules produces "equalist" justice: all become
equally guilty. Yet this equalist outcome seems to fly in the face
of individualized and proportional justice, where each defend-
ant's actions and intentions are weighed separately, and where
punishment is graded proportionately to the blameworthiness of
each defendant.
We reach a second empirical question: Is equalist justice
and punishment disproportionate, and thus cruel and unusual,
as judged by commonsense justice? A part of that question was
taken up when this "curious doctrine" came before the Supreme
Court in Tison v. Arizona.42 In Justice Brennan's oxymoronic
phrase, this "living fossil"4" not only still lives, but it would
sharply divide the Court.
B. The Law and Psychology at Odds
Though Justices may be at odds and the law may be in con-
flict, academic psychology's predictions are quite consistent.
"Attribution theorists" have long studied how people make judg-
ments of responsibility and blameworthiness. Fritz Heider, an
early attributional theorist, held that "it is an important principle
of common-sense psychology, as it is of scientific theory in gen-
eral, that man grasps reality, and can predict and control it, by
referring transient and variable behavior and events to relatively
42. 481 U.S. 137, 159 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. Id.
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unchanging underlying conditions, the so-called dispositional
properties of his world."' "Personal traits," someone's attitudes,
beliefs, or personality, can be viewed as dispositions, and a spe-
cific disposition can be whether someone is a responsible actor.
Ross and Fletcher, reviewing Heider's theory, state that in decid-
ing if someone is responsible or not we more likely infer respon-
sibility to that person "from intentional actions."45 We infer
intentionality when an actor appears (1) goal directed, (2)
appears to be the originator of the action, rather than a passive
recipient, and (3) appears to strive to achieve intended effects.
Extending Heider's theory to the felony-murder triggerman,
we would predict that this triggerman would not be seen as
blameworthy as the premeditated murderer, since the homicide
is neither intended nor sought. Heider's theory would also pre-
dict that the accomplices would be viewed as even less blamewor-
thy, since they neither originated the deadly action nor exerted
in that deadly direction.'
Jones and Davis proposed another attribution theory, which
they called the correspondent inference theory.4" The theory's
name derives from the finding that perceivers sometimes infer
another's dispositions directly from the other's actions: if we see
a person acting mean toward another, we may infer that this is a
mean person, or if we see a kindly act, we may infer a kindly
person; thus there may be a "correspondence" between behavior
and inferred disposition. Using this theory, the predictions of
difference between the felony-murder triggerman and the pre-
meditated murderer would be even greater than those derived
from Heider's theory, forJones and Davis maintain that disposi-
tional attributions are made only on the basis of intentional
behaviors; thus, the unintended death in the prototypical felony-
murder situation should not lead to strong condemnation.
Moreover, an act is perceived as intentional when the perceiver
believes the actor knew the behavior would produce the deadly
consequences, and believes the actor had control over the conse-
44. Firrz HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 79
(1958).
45. MICHAEL Ross & GARTHJ.O. FLETCHER, Attribution and Social Perception,
in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 73, 74 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson
eds., 1985).
46. Norman J. Finkel & Stephanie F. Smith, Principals and Accessories in
Capital Felony-Murder: The Proportionality Principle Reigns Supreme, 27 L. & Soc'Y
REv. 129 (1993) (In two experiments, we tested, and confirmed, these
extensions of Heider's theory; see HEIDER, supra note 44).
47. E.E. Jones & KE. Davis, From Acts to Dispositions: The Attribution Process
in Person Perception, in 2 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. (Leonard
Berkowitz ed., 1965).
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quences. But while knowing and controlling the deadly outcome
fit the typical premeditated murderer, they do not fit the felony-
murderer. This predicted difference should be even greater in
the accessory felony-murder cases, where the accessories often
claim that they did not know that killings would occur, and, since
they were not at the scene of the deaths, they could not exert any
control over the outcome.
Accessory felony-murder law asks jurors to find all partici-
pants equally guilty of murder. Psychological theory tells us that
this is not how people are likely to judge such situations. Before
we turn to the evidence, we must first turn to the Supreme
Court's evidence, as it was gauged in Enmund v. Floida48 and
Tison v. Arizona.
49
C. Two Cases, Two Rulings, and Too Many Doubts
In Enmund, Earl Enmund was the getaway driver, sitting in a
car when Sampson and Jeanette Armstrong attempted to rob a
farm house and killed Thomas and Eunice Kersey. Enmund was
charged with felony-murder, as the accessorial liability rule under
Floridajurisprudence made Enmund equally culpable to the trig-
germen, and he was found guilty of felony-murder and given the
death sentence.5 °
In the Tison case, the Tison brothers, Ricky and Raymond,
participated in breaking their father, Gary Tison, and his
cellmate, Randy Greenawald, out of Arizona State Prison, without
a shot being fired. Two days later, with a flat tire and no spare,
their father instructed them to flag down a passing motorist in
order to steal a car. The Lyons family stopped and was taken into
the desert at gunpoint. John Lyons asked the Tisons to leave his
family there with some water, and Gary Tison sent his sons to get
some water. As the sons were returning, they heard shots. All
four members of the Lyons family were killed. Ricky and Ray-
mond were found guilty of felony-murder, armed robbery, kid-
napping, and theft of an auto, and for the former, they were
sentenced to death as accessory felony-murderers. 5'
In Enmund and Tison an Eighth Amendment challenge was
raised. Was the death penalty disproportionate, and hence cruel
and unusual punishment for accessory felony-murder? Given the
Court's commitment to use objective indicia to the maximum
48. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
49. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
50. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 782.
51. Tison, 481 U.S. at 137.
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extent possible, 2 the Court acted much like social scientists -
the Justices analyzed the indicia55 in order to reach a judgment
about where community sentiment stood.
In summing up its analysis, the Enmund majority concluded
that the current judgments weighed heavily "on the side of
rejecting capital punishment for the crime at issue."5 Specifi-
cally, the Court found that of the thirty-six state and federal juris-
dictions that presently authorize the death penalty, "only eight
jurisdictions authorize imposition of the death penalty to be
imposed solely for participation in a robbery in which another
robber takes a life."
55
From the conclusions, it would seem that the empirics pro-
vided an open and shut case. Moreover, the Court connected
the empirics to the inadequate mens rea, noting that unlike Flor-
ida's felony-murder statute, eight other states "make knowing,
intentional, purposeful, or premeditated killing an element of
capital murder."
5 6
The minority reached the opposite conclusion, holding that
"the Court's peculiar statutory analysis cannot withstand closer
scrutiny."5 7 Whereas the Enmund majority found that in only
15% (8/52)51 of the jurisdictions could the death penalty be
imposed, the Enmund minority figure was 44% (23/52). Both
sides asked different questions and made different assumptions;
both did bad social science. A more defensible social science
analysis puts the percentage range at 15%-to-37% of the jurisdic-
tions allowing for the death sentence in Enmund-like situations,
far less than a majority.
59
What the Court did with jury decisions data was even more
suspect. Those data were fatally flawed because the Court had
only numerators - the number of cases where a death sentence
was given - but lacked the denominators - the number of such
cases brought to trial. This lack, which would stop the social sci-
entist, did not deter the Enmund majority.
52. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
53. Id. (The two sanctioned indicia were the interjurisdictional legislative
enactments data, and jury decisions data).
54. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 793. The 5-vote majority consisted of Justices
White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens; the 4-vote minority
consisted of Justices O'Connor, Powell, Rehnquist, and Burger, CJ.
55. Id. at 789.
56. Id. at 790.
57. Id. at 823 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
58. The denominator, 52, consists of the 50 states plus the District of
Columbia, plus the U.S. Code.
1 59. Finkel, Capital Felony-Murder, Objective Indicia, and Community Sentiment,
supra note 18, at 833.
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Tison was different, but no different. In this 5-to-4 decision
going the other way, the majority held that the death penalty for
Tison-like defendants was constitutional, and cited empirical evi-
dence which "powerfully suggests that our society does not reject
the death penalty as grossly excessive under these circum-
stances."6 ° Why do Enmund and Tison differ? To the Tison
majority, the Tison brothers fell into a different and intermedi-
ate class than did Enmund. The majority put forth two distinc-
tions, one based on participation and the other based on
culpability: the Tison brothers were "more major" participants in
the crime than the getaway driver Enmund; and the Tison broth-
ers had, or may have had, a more culpable mental state than
Enmund, one that could be characterized as showing "reckless
indifference to human life."
61
The Tison minority challenged the majority's distinctions,
believing that the Tison brothers' level of participation was indis-
criminable from Enmund's, and that the "[c]reation of a new
category of culpability is not enough to distinguish this case from
Enmund."62 Both majority and minority social science analyses
remain riddled with error. From a more objective analysis,63 the
Tison range of states that might support the death penalty turns
out to be 13%-to-44%, not all that different from the Enmund
range of 15%-to-37%; these ranges are still shy of majority (50%),
and certainly shy of the Tison majority's claim of a powerful per-
centage. The Tison Court cited the exact same jury decisions
data as in Enmund, with the same flaw present again - the Court
had only the numerators, but not the needed denominators to
make meaningful comparisions. Going a step further, however,
the Tison majority acknowledged the weakness of the data, unlike
the Enmund Court, but the majority in Enmund doubted
"whether it is possible to gather such information";' while now
admitting that the data were inadequate to sustain any conclu-
sion, the majority did not back off its own unwarranted and ille-
gitimate conclusion.
This is where social scientists doing social science and
Supreme Court Justices doing "social science" part company:
where the latter authoritatively pronounced a strong conclusion
60. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 154 (1987). The majority consisted of
Justices O'Connor, Powell, Scalia, White, and Rehnquist, C.J.; the minority, of
Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens.
61. Id. at 151.
62. Id. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. Finkel, Capital Felony-Murder, Objective Indicia, and Community Sentiment,
supra note 18, at 840-41.
64. Enmund v. Florida, 481 U.S. 782, 796 (1982).
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from inadequate data, the former would fall silent, in all likeli-
hood, rather than be stripped bare by peer review judges in the
publish or perish court. But on the issue of "community senti-
ment," the only conclusion that we can safely rest on, at this
point, is this: when the sound and fury of Enmund and Tison
were stilled, we still do not know where community sentiment
stands.
D. Sounder Substance to Community Sentiment
To reach sounder substance, a number of experiments were
run to test some of the "hypotheses" that are discernible from
Enmund and Tison. One hypothesis advanced was that Enmund
and the Tison brothers were different "types" of felony-murder
accessories, with the latter being more major and more culpable.
Would mock jurors, for example, "see" the distinction, and, more
importantly, would that distinction translate into harsher verdicts
and a higher percentage of death sentences for the latter? There
are also questions that involve the felony-murder triggerman vs.
all types of accessories: Would we find "equal justice" - where
the guilt and punishment for the former are transferred undi-
minished onto the latter - or would we find that mock jurors
make judgments of culpability individually, and proportionately
- and do not find accessories to be fungible with the
triggermen?
Only an experiment allows us to control and manipulate
variables in such a "clean" way. Doing a study of the Enmund and
Tison cases runs into a myriad of confounding differences: for
example, along with the hypothesized "different type of acces-
sory" difference, Earl Enmund and Ricky and Raymond Tison
were different in age, the number and types of crimes they were
charged with, the number of deaths that resulted, whether a
child was killed or not, and the degree of pretrial publicity sur-
rounding each case, and many more "defendant" and "case" vari-
able differences; moreover, they were tried in different states, by
different juries, under differing statutes and instructions, and
sentenced differently. With all of these factors presenting possi-
ble sources of variation, reaching a sound conclusion about
which factors are dispositive is impossible - unless we can con-
trol the variation. Hence we turn to the first experiment.
In the first experiment, four defendants, a getaway driver
A, a lookout B, a sidekick C, and a triggerman D, plan to rob a
65. See Finkel & Duff, supra note 31.
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liquor store. Mockjurors66 received one of four cases where how
the storekeeper dies was manipulated (the case variable). In HEART,
the storekeeper dies of a heart attack at the sight of the gun. In
STRUGGLE,67 the elderly clerk grabs at the gun in D's hand,
and, in the ensuing struggle, the gun discharges and the bullet
strikes and kills the clerk, suggesting, perhaps, more culpability
for defendant D. In HEINOUS, after the elderly clerk grabs at
the gun, D pulls away, smashes the gun into the face of the eld-
erly clerk again and again, and fires six shots in rapid succession
into the clerk who dies from the wounds. By manipulating case,
we ask, Does the heinousness of the death matter, and does it
matter for just the triggerman, or for all accessories as well? Case
four, called PREMED, is a control: just when defendants C and
D get -the money from the storekeeper and C says "let's go," D
says "no, I've been waiting to nail this old guy for two years, and
I'm not leaving any witness around"; with that, D opens fire, as C
stands by, and the clerk, hit with six bullets, subsequently dies. In
this case, where D is charged with premeditated, first degree
murder, A, B, and' C, are charged with felony-murder.
There were two verdict measures for each defendant: guilty
or not guilty on the armed robbery charge, and guilty, not guilty,
or guilty to a lesser charge on the felony-murder (or first degree
murder, for D, in PREMED) charge. Would either complete nul-
lifications68 (e.g., a not guilty verdict), or partial nullifications
(e.g., a lesser offense verdict) occur, and for whom, and under
what conditions? Since nullifications can occur for differing rea-
sons, i.e., because the crime is judged unjust, and because the
penalty appears too severe, two conditions were created to help
discriminate. Half the subjects got the case under the capital con-
dition, where the State was seeking the death penalty for all the
66. There were over two hundred mock jurors, both students and adults,
the latter included to increase the representativeness of the sample. To further
increase the generalizability of this sample, all subjects answered voir dire
questions in order to achieve a "death qualified" (DQ) subsample. DQs, as they
are called, can be viewed as a remainder - what is left over when you eliminate
those jurors who, because of their attitudes toward the death penalty, would
either (1) always vote for the death penalty (called ADPs - Automatic Death
Penalty types), (2) never vote for the death penalty (called Witherspoon
excludables), (3) be unwilling to follow the law (nullifiers), or (4) be
substantially impaired in making their decision (Witt excludables). In our
sample, 73.1% were death qualified (DQs), a percentage that corresponds to
national figures. A last word on subjects: in this experiment and the ones to
follow, there were no significant verdict or sentencing differences between
students and adults.
67. This case condition was originally designated as ACCIDENT, but
STRUGGLE seems more apt.
68. See supra note 4.
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defendants, and the other half got the case under the noncapital
condition. If the nullifications are roughly equal in the capital
and noncapital conditions, then it is not the death penalty causing
the nullifications, but something about the crime or equalism.
But if nullifications greatly increase in the capital condition, the
death penalty is the obvious suspect.
Starting with verdicts, we find agreement on the underlying
felony, armed robbery. For example, guilty verdicts for defend-
ants C and D were 98% and 99%. If subjects are following the
felony-murder rule, then the guilty percentage on the felony-
murder charge should be about the same. But that does not
result. Looking at the guilty percentages across cases, defendant
A is found guilty 2% of the time, B 15%, C 48%, and D 77%.
These percentages show sizable drops from the robbery percent-
ages, and these drops occur in capital and noncapital conditions.
The not guilty verdicts reveal the complete nullification picture:
defendant A is found not guilty 89% of the time, B 40%, C 15%,
and D only 2%. Not only do we see a nullification effect, but that
effect reveals proportional rather than equalist judgments of
culpability.
Two other notes. When the death gets more heinous (going
from HEART to STRUGGLE to HEINOUS to PREMED), D's
guilty percentage on the felony- or first degree murder charge
increases (from 63% to 79% to 88% to 92%). However, the
guilty percentages stay roughly the same for the three accesso-
ries. Thus, while subjects make harsherjudgments of the trigger-
man, they do not transfer those judgments to the accessories.
Commonsense judgments of the principal and the accessories
remain distinct, whereas in the law, through accessorial liability,
they are linked. The second note is that the D's guilty percent-
age across the felony-murder cases is 77%, whereas it reaches
92% when D is a premeditated murderer. Thus, we see two bright
lines. first, and brightest, subjects clearly differentiate the trigger-
man from accessories, and make individual and separate deter-
minations of guilt; and second, we see indications that subjects
differentiate the premeditated from the felony-murder
triggerman.
The number of death sentences and two "death rate" per-
centages (D/N and D/FM)69 were calculated for each defendant
69. D, the numerator, is the number of death sentences given. N, the
denominator, is the number of DQ subjects in the capital condition who
rendered a judgment for that defendant in that case. Since the non-DQ
subjects have substantial qualms against the death penalty and would be
eliminated from a capital jury, the DQs are the appropriate sample; in addition,
only capital condition DQs have both the inclination and the opportunity to
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by case. For the D/N percentage, we see a sizable difference
between the premeditated murder triggerman (64.3%) and the
felony-murder triggermen (16.5%), with the former getting the
death sentence approximately four times more frequently than
the latter. Second, focusing only on the felony-murder trigger-
man, we see an increase in the death sentence rate as the cases
progress from HEART (4.3%) to STRUGGLE (12%) to HEI-
NOUS (29%), indicating an increasingly harsh judgment of D's
culpability; however, this increasingly harsh judgment does not
transfer to A, B, and C, whose death rates are much lower and
fairly constant across the cases. And third, when we compare the
death rates for A (0%), B (1.9%), and C (5.6%) to the felony-
murder triggerman D (16.5%), we clearly see that subjects are
judging the defendants individually and proportionately, and not
administering equalist punishment. Thus, a rejection of equal-
ism in favor of proportional judgments results, as does the two
bright line distinctions between the principal and the accesso-
ries, and between the premeditated and felony-murder
triggerman.
These effects were not only large and powerful, they were
demonstrable in different ways. For example, we presented these
cases to subjects under what we called "the ninth Justice" para-
digm. Here we told the subjects that defendants A, B, C, and D
had been sentenced to death and were appealing their death
sentence as cruel and unusual punishment. They were further
told that the other justices were divided 4-4 on whether to let
stand or reverse and remand the death sentence. They were
given two lists of reasons - one for reversing and remanding,
one for letting stand the death sentence - and quotations taken
from Supreme Court cases. Subjects then had to make a let
stand or reverse and remand decision, and give their reasons.
The "reverse and remand" percentages for the four defendants
were 97% (A), 83% (B), 69% (C), and 53% (D) across all cases.
Only in case HEINOUS, and only for D, was the let stand per-
centage (68%) greater than reverse and remand.
One problem in generalizing these results to Tison is that
the Tison majority could claim that our hypothetical accessories,
A, B, and C, were less culpable and not the more major partici-
pants that the majority claimed for the Tison brothers. Hence,
give the death sentence at the beginning of the case. For the second percentage,
D/FM, the denominator, FM, is the number of DQ subjects in the capital
condition who rendered a guilty verdict on the felony-murder (or first degree
murder) charge. This FM denominator represents those subjects who have the
inclination and the opportunity at the sentencing phase to give the death
sentence, since only a guilty verdict can lead to the death sentence.
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we ran a second experiment 70 where we "upped" the culpability
and participation level of both B and C: both carry loaded guns
now; and the sidekick points his loaded gun at the storekeeper,
and fires recklessly over the head of the storekeeper when the
latter hesitates in opening the cash register. We tested six differ-
ent cases, even two cases where a police officer dies, which did
not obtain in Tison.
The results were much the same. While all subjects found
all defendants guilty on the underlying felony, sizable and pro-
portional nullifications occur on the felony-murder charge: the
not guilty percentages were 56% (A), 42% (B), 20% (C), and 5%
(D). The death sentence rates also show the proportional effect:
0% (A), 1% (B), 8% (C), and 18% (D). And the death sentence
rate for the premeditated murderer was 94%, which was about 5
times what it was for the felony-murder triggerman.
In subsequent experiments, 71 we used the Tison case
directly. We created a new Tison brother who was even more
reckless, culpable, major, and on the scene of the death. We had
subjects try defendants separately, or in trials with multiple
defendants. But however we varied the cases, defendants, and
trial conditions, the basic results recurred. The death sentence
rates for our three accessories were always low, varying between
0% and 10%, and 5-to-7 times lower than the Tison triggerman.
We also repeated our "ninth Justice" paradigm, where sub-
jects had to make a let stand or reverse and remand decision for
each defendant. Two things were different: subjects were get-
ting the actual Tson case, and they were given no list of reasons,
but had to write out their own reasons for deciding as they did.
The let stand decisions were similar to previous experiments: the
let stand percentages were 10% (A), 15% (B), 26% (C), and 83%
(D). The reasons for their decisions were illuminating. Those
who said "let stand" cited that (1) the defendant could have pre-
vented the death but did not; (2) intended to kill; and (3) was a
major participant and had a past criminal record. These reasons
fit the Tison triggerman far more closely than the accessories,
and stress intent and control, those factors that attribution theo-
rists labelled as central in reaching culpabilityjudgments. Those
who said "reverse and remand" cited the fact that the defendant
(1) was a minor participant and could not control; (2) did not
have a criminal record; and (3) did not intend to kill. These
reasons fit the accessories far more than the triggerman, and
highlight the absence of intent and control.
70. See Finkel & Duff, supra note 31.
71. See Finkel & Smith, supra note 46.
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Finally, in an experiment that sought to test whether the
proportionality principle or equalist justice would rule at early
developmental ages, kindergarten, second and third graders, and
fifth graders were given two felony-murder-like scenarios, and
asked to make culpability and punishment judgments.72 As not
to frighten the youngsters with death but to maintain a parallel
to felony-murder, a "crime" is plotted and "something worse"
then happens. In one of our two cases, the "stolen math test"
scenario, the ringleader plots to steal the math test from the copy
room while the teacher is at lunch, and he gets several accom-
plices to go along, but unbeknownst to the accomplices the ring-
leader also steals money from the teacher's purse. In our second
case, the "trespass" scenario, the ringleader persuades his accom-
plices to trespass, and a fight occurs where a boy is injured by the
ringleader. In both cases, there is an agreement to do something
they know is wrong, and then something worse happens. The
three accomplices (Al, Bill, and Frank), along with the ring-
leader (John), differ in their degree of participation, and they
were designed to create a similar array to the felony-murder
experiments, roughly paralleling the getaway driver, lookout,
sidekick, and triggerman. Even at the kindergarten level, sub-
jects clearly discriminate the principal from the accessories: 53%
judge Al and Bill as having "low" culpability, while 35% judge
Frank as having "medium," and 60% judge John as having "high"
culpability. These culpability distinctions translated into punish-
ment distinctions, which were categorized into four levels: no
punishment, loss of privileges, physical punishment, and a com-
bination of loss of privileges and physical punishment. For the
kindergarteners, the dominant punishment for Al, Bill, and even
Frank, was "no punishment," but John gets far more severe
punishment.
By the second and third grades, the proportionality princi-
ple is most evident in their culpability and punishment judg-
ments, with the spread among the accessories being much like
what we found for adults. For example, under the "high" culpa-
bility ratings, 100% of fifth graders give this rating to John, 92%
for Frank, 12% for Bill, and 0% for Al. Similarly, at the top level
punishment category, we find 62% forJohn, 44% for Frank, 12%
for Bill, and 0% for Al.
72. Norman J. Finkel et al., Equal or Proportional Justice?: Children's
Judgments of Accessory Liability, Paper presented at the American
Psychological Association's Annual Convention (August 22, 1993) (on file with
author).
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E. Proportionality Reigns Supreme
Felony-murder, spawned from error and contrivance, manu-
factures murder for principals and accessories alike. It may be
murder most foul or monstrous, an anachronistic remnant or a
legal fiction, but this living fossil lives, divides the Court, and con-
tinues to produce death sentences. It creates a most curious way
of assessing and assigning guilt, one that appears to detach crimi-
nal liability from individual culpability, and one that appears
quite detached and foreign from how ordinary people make
such judgments.
The Supreme Court has had to gauge "community senti-
ment" from the objective indicia. The Tison Court, with its
flawed reading, held to equalism, upheld the death penalty for
Tison-like defendants, and claimed that community sentiment
supported this conclusion when reckless indifference and more
major participation by an accessory were shown. The Court's
empirical claim is undermined by our experimental results across
a wide number of cases and conditions. Community sentiment
strongly opposed the death penalty for felony-murder accesso-
ries. Community sentiment rejected accessorial liability that cre-
ates an equalist outcome. Community sentiment differentiates
felony-murderers from premeditative murderers. And over-
whelmingly, community sentiment favors proportional justice,
based on each person's actions and intentions, and that senti-
ment is evident in the youngest subjects we tested. Commonsense
justice seems to be saying, in loud, clear, and consistent tones,
"that the law is wrong, and ought to change."
The suggested direction of change, as read from the com-
munity's verdicts and sentences, is not toward anarchy, but
toward proportionality and coherence. For example, none of
the defendants walks from the courtroom free; they are pun-
ished, but not for murder. The community does lay the death at
the doorstep of the principal, and is willing to exact a tougher
punishment on him, but not so much that he is indiscriminable
from the premeditated murderer; there is a difference in intent,
here. And intent clearly matters to the community. The overall
lesson seems to be: that when intent is ignored or manufactured,
reducing culpability to an either/or choice that doesn't fit with
commonsense justice, then murder most foul results, and nullifi-
cations lie in wait.
III. INSANITY'S MADDENING CHANGES, MUCH ADO..:
Change has been the constant in the insanity defense equa-
tion. When a great case (e.g., M'Naghten, Hinckley) produced a
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so-called "wrongful" verdict - typically a "not guilty by reason of
insanity" (NGRI) - the press for a new test boiled and brewed,
as legal and psychological arguments, and myths, fears, and poli-
tics, commingled in the stew. The jurors' perspective, when
given any thought at all, was charitably denounced as soft-
headed, misguided, or willfully anarchic,7" yet these "dysfunc-
tional" jurors continued to declare such defendants "insane."
Nonetheless, the "change the test" process remained maddingly
and schizophrenically split: legal notions and commonsense justice
seldom made contact.
Though legislators, monarchs, judges, and justices have
often ignored the jurors' perspective, the law cannot ignore the
jurors for long: insanity tests eventually make contact with the
jurors' reality, when the new test meets the new case - before
the next jury. Yet even before that happens, a prediction is
implied. To illustrate, critics claimed that the wild beast test"4
was off base in focusing on memories and perceptions, and too
demanding in its insistence on total deprivation. M'Naghten
shifted the focus from memories and perceptions to cognition,
and reduced total deprivation to "pockets of madness" - delu-
sions.75 From these changes, M'Naghten should produce more
73. Norman J. Finkel, Maligning and Misconstruing Jurors' Insanity Verdicts:
A Rebuttal, 1 FoRENSic REP. 65 (1988).
74. Rex v. Arnold, 16 Howell's St. Trials 695, 764-65 (1724) (in Mr.
Justice Tracy's summary, he noted that "it is not every kind of frantic humour,
or something unaccountable in a man's actions, that points him out to be such
a madman as is to be exempted from punishment: it must be a man that is
totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he
is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute or a wild beast .... ").
This test, with its accent on memories and perceptions, was the test under
which James Hadfield was tried in 1800, for attempting to kill King George III.
Hadfield, 27 Howell's St. Trials 1281 (1800). Hadfield's counsel, Erskine,
skillfully mocked this test: "If a TOTAL deprivation of memory was intended by
these great lawyers to be taken in the literal sense of the words: - if it was
meant, that, to protect a man from punishment, he must be in such a state of
prostrated intellect, as not to know his name, nor his condition, nor his relation
towards others - that if a husband, he should not know he was married; or, if a
father, could not remember that he had children; nor know the road to his
house, nore his property in it - then no such madness ever existed in the
world." Id. at 1312.
75. McNaughtan's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). There are at least twelve
different spellings of McNaughtan, with "M'Naghten" being the most common.
Daniel M'Naghten may have spelled his own name differently, on occasion,
thereby adding to the confusion; see RicHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM
WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF DANIEL McNAUGHTAN (1981).
After M'Naughten's acquittal on grounds of insanity, particularly as he did
not meet the "wild beast test," the House of Lords took the unusual step of
summoning all 15 Justices to demand clarification of the law. Within their
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NGRI verdicts than the wild beast test. M'Naghten plus the irre-
sistible impulse test76 should produce more NGRI verdicts than
M'Naghten alone. Durham's "product rule" test,77 which critics
believed opened the insanity door wider than ever, should pro-
duce more NGRI verdicts than all of its predecessors. The ALI
test, with cognitive and volitional prongs,' s should produce fewer
reply, we find the "M'Naghten rules." The two rules were (1) To establish a
defense on the ground of insanity it must be clearly proved that, at the time of
committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing, or he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong; (2) Where a person labors under partial delusions only and is not in
other respects insane, and commits an offense in consequence thereof, he must
be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with
respect to which the delusion exists were real"; see United States v. Currens, 290
F.2d 751, n.15 (3d Cir. 1961).
76. Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854 (Ala. 1887). This test adds a volitional
prong, noting that if a person lacks freedom of will, then his power to choose
right from wrong, or to even govern his mind, is undermined. In England,
some influential judges, most notably Sir James Fitzjames Stephens, were
pushing for this addition, and back in the 1800 Hadfield trial, Erskine spoke of
"motives irresistible," this prong was not formerly added in English law; rather,
some judges smuggled the concept in under an elasticized interpretation of
McNaughtan; see FINKEL, supra note 24.
The central controversy with a volitional test is the twilight vs. dusk
controversy: How do we tell impulses that cannot be resisted from those the
defendant simply failed to resist? Id.
77. Durham v' United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). In Judge
Bazelon's opinion:
If you believe he was suffering from a diseased or defective mental
condition when he committed the act, but believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the act was not the product of such mental
abnormality, you may find him guilty. Unless you believe beyond a
reasonable doubt either that he was not suffering from a diseased or
defective mental conditon, or that the act was not the product of such
abnormality, you must find the accused not guilty by reason of
insanity.
Id. at 875.
The critics of this test noted that key terms, such as "mental disease" and
"product," were not defined; in this void, mental health experts were likely to
have too much influence, it was claimed, usurping the jurors' function; see, e.g.,
ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANrrY DEFENSE (1967).
78. The American Law Institute made its recommendations on the
matter of insanity one year after Durham, and a number of states, including the
District of Columbia, eventually adopted the test. It was a two pronged test,
where "a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law." MPC, supra note 20, § 4.01.
Critics noted that the first prong was a semantic reworking of
M'Naughten's cognitive, right from wrong test, and the second prong was the
problematic volitional test. See, e.g., FINKEL, supra note 24, at 39.
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NGRI verdicts than Durham but more than M'Naghten alone.
And for the new Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA) test, since
it eliminates the volitional prong,79 less NGRI verdicts than ALI
should result. But the empirical question is: Do tests work in
practice as their supporters predict?
A. While Tests Fail to Discriminate, the Jurors Do
Professor RitaJames Simon presented a disguised version of
the Monty Durham case to multiple juries. The case involved a
man caught breaking into a house in broad daylight, who stole
less than $50.00 worth of goods (e.g., a cheap cigarette lighter,
cuff links). Now the sharp-eyed psychology or law student, unfa-
miliar with the case, might wonder why this is an "insanity" case.
The answer is found in the way Monty Durham was caught by the
police: he was found in the middle of the living room, crouched
like a duck, with a newspaper over his head! What Simon varied
was the test instructions. Some juries got the M'Naghten test,
while others got the Durham test, but no significant verdict dif-
ferences resulted. She found that jurors did not ignore the test,
but reconstrued the instructions in a "cognitive" direction."0 In
early work, l I expanded on Simon's methodology in two direc-
tions - by increasing the number of cases and the number of
tests. Subjects rendered verdicts in five cases,8 2 and were
assigned to one of six different insanity test instructions: the wild
beast test, M'Naghten, M'Naghten plus the irresistible impulse
addition, Durham, the ALI test, and a proposed new test called
the Disability of Mind test.8 3 Whereas Simon found no differ-
79. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 401-02,
98 Stat. 2057 (1984). This Act followed two years of Senate and House
Hearings on the insanity matter in the wake of United States v. Hinckley, 525 F.
Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981). Congress decided that the substantive problem with
the ALI test, which Hinckley was tried and found NGRI under, was the
volitional prong, so an amputation of the prong was performed. For criticisms
of the process and the outcome, see, e.g., PERLIN, Supra note 11; Finkel & Fulero,
supra note 25.
80. Rita M. James, Jurors'Assessment of Criminal Responsibility, 7 Soc. PROBS.
58 (1969); see also RITA JAMES SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY
(1967), Rita M. James, Status and Competence of Jurors, 64 AMER. J. Soc. 563
(1959).
81. See Norman J. Finkel et al., Insanity Defenses: From the Jurors'Perspective,
9 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 77 (1985).
82. Increasing the number of cases increases the generalizability of the
findings, and protects against the possibility, in a one-case experiment, that the
experimenter has inadvertently chosen an outlier case.
83. HERBERT FINGARETrE & ANN F. HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979). In the "disability of mind" (DOM) test, partial
culpability, as well as culpability for bringing about the disability of mind, are
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ences between two tests, we found no significant differences over-
all among six tests. In still another experiment, Finkel84 gave
one group of subjects the new IDRA test; a second group had the
two pronged ALI test, and a third group had a nens rea uipdaate of
the old wild beast test. Again, no significant verdict differences
among the tests were found. These findings are not only sober-
ing, but strongly suggest that Congress's attempt to limit the
insanity defense 5 through its IDRA progeny had failed. When
taken together with the prior findings, IDRAjoins a long line of
test failures.
If no test works any differently than any other, what would
happen if subjects were given "no test" at all? This was the ques-
tion Finkel and Handel86 examined, as they told subjects to use
their "own best lights" to decide these cases. Specifically, subjects
were told that they had to make a decision (a verdict - NGRI or
Guilty), but that we were giving them no insanity test instruction;
rather, just using their own judgment, they were to decide. We
found no significant verdict differences between the "no instruc-
tion" condition versus the various "insanity test instructions" con-
ditions.87 Given these findings, an obvious question is: Why do
tests fail to produce discriminably different verdicts, and fail to
produce differences from "no test" at all?
The familiar refrain is to blame the jurors - they don't lis-
ten to the instructions, they ignore them, they can't comprehend
them - the refrain goes on. The only problem with this refrain
is that it is out of tune with the empirics. In Simon's work,jurors
did not ignore or willfully disregard instructions. In Finkel's
work,88 subjects consistently made case-by-case discriminations.
Moreover, ifjurors had biased or bizarre views regarding insanity
- views that should have been set loose under a "no test" condi-
assessed; thus this test, unlike the sanctioned tests, is not an either-or, NGRI or
guilty judgment.
84. Norman J. Finkel, The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984: "Much Ado
About Nothing, 8 BEHAVIORAL SCI. AND THE LAW 403 (1989).
85. Limiting the Insanity Defense: Hearings on S. 818, S. 1106, S. 1558, S.
2669 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982).
86. Norman J. Finkel & Sharon F. Handel, Jurors and Insanity Do Test
Instructions Instruct? 1 FORENSic REP. 65 (1988); NormanJ. Finkel & Sharon F.
Handel, How Jurors Construe "Insanity," 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 41 (1989).
87. This finding recurred in several experiments, with students and
adults, where subjects who used their "own best lights" reached similar verdicts
with those who used the wild beast test, M'Naghten, M'Naghten plus the
irresistible impulse addition, Durham, ALI, and IDRA. See, e.g., Finkel, supra
note 75.
88. Finkel et al., supra note 72; Finkel, supra note 73.
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tion - we do not see it, for their verdicts closely fall where test
instruction verdicts land. The empirics also show that jurors dis-
criminate among defendants on items relating to culpability,
such as how responsible the defendant was for her act and how
much mitigation was warranted for her mental condition. And
finally, subjects discriminated on an item the law does not take
into account in insanity cases - the defendant's culpability for
bringing about her mental deterioration.89 This "culpable negli-
gence" factor, germane to their assessment of the moral blame-
worthiness, is not part of the legal instructions.
B. Commonsense Insanity
There may be a convergence between empirical findings
and what a fewjurisprudes have advocated - that legal insanity
ought to rest on the commonsense perspective. These "common
sense" advocates have argued that medicalized definitions of
"mental illness" and "insanity" leave these terms outside ordinary
thinking, removing insanity from its proper moral context. One
such proponent, Professor Michael Moore,"° puts it this way:
If the issue is a moral one .... then the legal definition of
the phrase should embody those moral principles that
underlie the intuitive judgment that mentally ill human
beings are not responsible.
.... What is thus needed is an analysis of that popular
moral notion .... What have people meant by mental ill-
ness such that, both on and off juries, they have for centu-
ries excused the otherwise wrongful acts of mentally ill
persons?91
Professor Stephen Morse92 makes a similar point. He rejects
"pseudomedicalizations" and criticizes those legal and semantic
debates that create a "distinction without a difference."9" What
89. For example, subjects who find the epileptic defendant guilty
acknowledge that at the moment of the act she was going into seizure and
unconscious when the gun went off; they do not hold her responsible for that.
What they hold her responsible for is for going off her seizure medication two
days earlier without consulting her doctor; it is this "negligence" or
"recklessness" that they weigh, and find blameworthy.
90. MICHAEL S. MooRE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY- RETHINKING THE
RELATIONSHIP (1984).
91. Id. at 244.
92. Reform of the Federal Insanity Defense: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 331 (1983) (statement and additional remarks of Stephen J.
Morse); see also Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense
Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 779, 780 (1985).
93. Morse, supra note 92, at 390.
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Morse suggests is "the craziness test": "A defendant is not guilty
by reason of insanity if at the time of the offense the defendant
was extremely crazy and the craziness affected the criminal
behavior."94 Morse's supposition "is that ordinary citizens are
invoking such a craziness test,"95 so the law ought to follow the
path laid by the community.
Fingarette and Hasse96 also believe that traditional legal tests
wrongly focus on "symptoms" and fail to identify the essence of
insanity, which involves mens. This mens factor is the "capacity for
rational conduct,"97 for in the absence of such a capacity, we
have a person who is not "response-able"; this "is central to what
we wish to express when we speak of someone as 'out of his
mind,' 'out of touch with reality,' 'mentally incompetent,' 'crazy,'
or 'mad.' ""
Judge Bazelon also writes critically of this symptom focus,
stating that "[t]he fundamental objection to the right-wrong test,
however, is not that criminal irresponsibility is made to rest upon
an inadequate, invalid or indeterminable symptom or manifesta-
tion, but that it is made to rest upon any particular symptom."
99
Bazelon proposed the 'justly responsible" test: jurors would be
instructed that a defendant is not responsible "if at the time of
his unlawful conduct his mental or emotional processes or behav-
ior controls were impaired to such an extent that he cannot justly
be held responsible.""' The implication of the "justly responsi-
ble" test is that it "candidly informs the jury that it is their func-
tion to apply the moral standards of the community."101
These "common sense" advocates decry the medicalized,
legalized, and jargonized notions of "mental illness," and the
grounding of insanity on symptoms. Such trends move insanity
from where it ought to be - a proper moral judgment, resting
on the moral principles that underlie ordinary people's under-
standing of sane and insane. But however commonsensical these
"commonsense" notions sound, they still lack a sound empirical
base. What is missing, and what is still needed, as Moore pointed
out, is an analysis of what people mean by "sane" and "insane,"
94. Id.
95. Finkel, De Facto, supra note 18, at 110.
96. Supra note 83, at 218.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Bazelon, supra note 9, at 45.
100. Id. at 50-51.
101. Id. at 51.
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such that they continue to excuse the otherwise wrongful acts of
some insanity defendants as morally just.10 2
If people have, invoke, and use intuitive concepts of "sane"
and "insane" to decide insanity cases, we need a way to get them
to identify and explain their constructs, and we need to ask the
question in a way that doesn't cause them to merely parrot back
the specific insanity test language. Thus, we can best get at the
intuitive constructs under a "no test" condition. In Finkel and
Handel's work,' where no test instruction was given, subjects
were asked to write out the factors they found most relevant and
determinative in reaching their verdict, and to explain their
reasons. 1
04
Turning to the results, the first point to note is that subjects
invoke a number of relevant and determinative constructs per
case, 2.5 on the average. This indicates complex construing,
rather than simplistic construing; in fact, since most legal tests
identify only one (e.g., IDRA) or two constructs (e.g., ALI), the
"simplism" would seem to be in the legal test, not in the subjects'
minds. Second, subjects rendering a NGRI verdict and subjects
rendering a guilty verdict do not construe the case along identi-
cal construct dimensions, but along orthogonal lines. Thus, it is
not a simple, polar-opposite type of construing, where guilty sub-
jects see "clear thinking" while NGRI subjects see "distorted
thinking." And third, subjects change their relevant and deter-
102. Finkel, De Facto, supra note 18, at 110.
103. Goldstein, supra note 77.
104. These reasons were categorized by independent raters using a seven-
construct schema that proved reliable. One end of the construct dimension
reflects the "insane" (NGRI) judgment, whereas the other reflects the "sane"
(guilty) judgment. The seven dimensions were: (1) incapacity/capacity to
make responsible choices; (2) impaired/unimpaired awareness and
perceptions; (3) distorted/clear thinking; (4) could not control/could control
impulses and actions; (5) nonculpable/culpable actions; (6) no evil motive/evil
motive; and (7) others at fault/others not at fault. Some of these dimensions
reflect the traditional symptom focus: for example, construct (2), impaired
awareness and perception, is the wild beast construct; (3) distorted thinking,
reflects the cognitive focus of M'Naghten and IDRA (4) impulse control
reflects the irresistible impulse addition and volitional prong of ALI. Unrelated
to specific symptoms is construct (1), the incapacity dimension, which reflects a
deeper essence to insanity. Construct (5), the culpable actions dimension,
reflects negligence or recklessness before the moment of the act, such as going
off medication, or starting to drink while on medication, or dropping out of
therapy against medical advice. Construct (6) judges the motivation for the act,
and whether the motive was evil or not, and construct (7) cites whether others
are at fault (contributory blame) or not.
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minative constructs from case to case, and this is particularly so
for the "symptomatic" constructs. °5
These results are good news/bad news. The good news is
that jurors do make fine discriminations; the bad news is that
complex, orthogonal, and changing constructs do not appear to
yield consistency. However, there were two construct dimensions
that did achieve a number of first rankings as either an NGRI or
guilty factor across cases: the capacity/incapacity construct, and
the culpable/nonculpable construct. These results were repli-
cated in another experiment,10 6 where the capacity and culpable
constructs were again salient across cases; moreover, because in
this second experiment legal tests were given, it was found that
those tests failed to either suppress or channel the subjects' intui-
tive constructs along designated de jure lines. Put another way,
the subjects' intuitive constructs of "sane" and "insane" remained
resistant to black-letter law's guidelines, yet powerfully determi-
native of verdict.
From this empirical work, citizens seem to diverge from
black-letter law in two ways. First, they invoke a deeper meaning
to insanity than mere symptoms, a meaning closer to the moral
question of whether the actor is responsible or not. The com-
monsense construct denotes greater depth and nuance than the
law's constructs. But we also discover, through the construct of
culpable actions, a divergence of type rather than just degree of
culpability. It will shortly be argued that commonsensejustice is not
manufacturing a type of culpability that isn't there, but rather
that black-letter law has long ignored this type of culpability
when it comes to insanity.
Professor Robinson notes that criminal law's treatment of
"causing the conditions of one's own defense" is "inadequate,"
"frequently irrational, and is a poor approximation of our collec-
tive sense of justice." °7 This doctrinal confusion creates confu-
sion for the jurors when they see two separate and distinct
actions and intentions requiring independent culpability judg-
ments - but find only one type of culpability on the verdict
105. The cognitive construct (distorted/clear thinking), the volitional
construct (could not control/could control impulses and actions), and the
awareness construct (impaired/unimpaired awareness and perception), which
are quite relevant in the historic legal tests, did not turn out to be relevant
across cases.
106. Finkel, supra note 75.
107. Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A
Study in the Limits of Theoy in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REv. 1, 2 (1985).
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form. As Fletcher notes,' °8 criminal law tends to conflate differ-
ent types of causation, and doctrinal confusion results.
C. Shades of Culpability
Not only do people see different types of culpability, but
they see shadings. If people see "grey" but insanity is defined as a
"black-or-white," then jurors have another problem: they must fit
"grey" into one of two categories, neither of which matches their
judgment. However, giving jurors a third option, be it dimin-
ished responsibility or Guilty But Mentally Ill (GBMI), arouses
fears. The American Psychiatric Association's fearful claim is typ-
ical, predicting that jurors will use this third option as an "easy
way out," avoiding "the difficult moral issues inherent in adjudi-
cating guilt or innocence... settling conveniently on guilty but
mentally ill.""09 Even though the empirical evidence shows that
jurors make complex moral judgments - more complex than
the law's insanity distinctions - the charges of simplism and
avoidance arise once more.110
Data from Michigan, the state that first introduced GBMI,
provide few insights into what jurors do, since over 90% of Michi-
gan's insanity trials were bench trials, before a judge and not a
jury. 1 ' In an empirical test of GBMI, Roberts et al. created a
hypothetical case of a defendant who kills a mailman. They
manipulated "mental disorder" of the defendant, creating four
mental disorder conditions: the defendant either had an antiso-
cial personality disorder, a schizotypal personality disorder, para-
noid schizophrenia with delusions unrelated to the crime, or
paranoid schizophrenia with delusions related to the crime.
They also manipulated "bizarreness" of the crime, either bizarre
(i.e., defendant cut the heart out) or nonbizarre, and they
manipulated "planfulness," whether the crime showed planfil-
ness or not. But the basic question concerned the verdict pat-
tern, and what would happen when subjects had the GBMI
option.
112
They found that 66.7% of the verdicts across their four
mental disorder conditions turned out to be GBMI, and con-
cluded that most "subjects preferred to utilize the GBMI option
as a compromise verdict even in the face of very severe mental
108. Fletcher, supra note 37, at 589.
109. AmERiCAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY
DEFENSE 9 (1982).
110. See supra notes 73-89 and accompanying text.
111. Caton F. Roberts et al., Implicit Theories of Criminal Responsibility:
Decision Making and the Insanity Defense, 11 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 207, 211 (1987).
112. Id. at 212-14.
COMMONSENSE JUSTICE
illness.""1 They reached that conclusion, however, despite the
fact that their subjects "who decided GBMI were more confident
... of their decisions than either subjects who decided NGRI...
or Guilty."" 4
From Roberts et al.'s results, it appears as if the critics of
jurors and the third option may have been right. Yet there are
reasons to suspect that Roberts et al.'s method may have inflated
the use of the third option." 5 In Finkel and Duff's work," 6
order was counter-balanced, as one group got the three-choice
schema first, then the two-choice, while a second group got the
reverse order. Moreover, the two verdict renderings were sepa-
rated by a week's time. The third option here was called "dimin-
ished responsibility" (DR), and subjects were given no legal
definition of DR, but merely told that guilt and punishment are
lessened because of the defendant's mental condition. By not
giving a legal definition which might constrain its use, we maxi-
mized the likelihood of overuse, if subjects had a penchant for
using this as an easy out, as was alleged.
Across their four cases, Finkel and Duff found that the DR
verdicts accounted for 41% of all verdicts, a far cry from Roberts
et al.'s 66.7% figure, and one that does not immediately suggest
overuse. Second, the DR verdicts came from both the guilty and
NGRI verdicts, which contradicts the critics' predictions that sub-
jects would use this verdict to convict those who should be excul-
pated (i.e., the NGRIs). Though DR use across cases was 41%,
there were significant differences in its use by case, evidence that
jurors used that verdict selectively, not indiscriminantly. Finally,
not one subject (0%) used the DR verdict for all four cases, again
indicating selectivity.
The ratings of these defendants show that subjects who
render a DR verdict "see" the defendant differently than those
113. Id. at 226.
114. Id. at 218.
115. In their methodology, subjects rendered a verdict in the traditional
two-choice schema, with NGRI and Guilty being the two choices. But almost
immediately thereafter, the researchers then gave the third choice option, and
asked subjects to render another verdict for the same case, now having a three-
choice schema featuring NGRI, Guilty, and GBMI. This second verdict
rendering, following on the heels of the first, may have created the impression
(i.e., a demand characteristic) that subjects were expected to use the new, third
category. Moreover, since they did not balance "order" by having half the
subjects do the three-choice schema first and then the two-choice schema, we
cannot be sure that an order effect or a demand characteristic was not
operating - which might have inflated the results.
116. NormanJ. Finkel & Kevin B. Duff, The lnsanity Defense GivingJurors
a Third Option, 2 FolRNsic REP., 235 (1989).
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who render either a guilty or NGRI verdict. If subjects are using
the DR verdict appropriately, we would expect their ratings to fall
between guilty and NGRI, and they consistently do. If the DR
verdict is a "true" in-between verdict rather than a compromise,
then we should see further evidence of this in the determinative
constructs subjects invoke. If DR reflects some culpability, but
less than guilty, and some mitigation, but less than NGRI's excul-
pation, then the DR subjects should be invoking a mixture of
NGRI and guilty constructs. And they do.
These results were replicated in another experiment'
17
which featured a comparison of the DR option (with no legal test
definition) and the GBMI option, where Michigan's legal word-
ing was provided. There were no significant differences in terms
of verdicts, ratings, and constructs cited between the DR and
GBMI schemas, as usage (DR = 40.2%, GBMI = 33.9%) was mod-
erate overall, and selective and discriminative by case.
In these experiments, the subjects' constructs are more deter-
minative of verdict than particular insanity tests and other vari-
ables considered, and these constructs are not merely an artifact
of making a verdict. 1 Constructs are real, and they remain
determinative. When researchers looked at the subjects' con-
structs in regard to the GBMI verdict, they found that subjects
use the GBMI verdict "to signify diminished blame and punish-
ment."119 Thus, while GBMI was supposed to be a "functionally
guilty" verdict, subjects do use it as a mitigating midground cate-
gory, reflecting diminished responsibility.
D. When an Insanity Test Tracks Commonsense Judgments
Given that subjects see different types of culpability, and dif-
ferent degrees of culpability - what has been referred to as "rel-
ative culpability" "' - a new insanity test was developed by
Finkel 2' that incorporates these culpability distinctions and
shadings. Finkel's test asks mock jurors to make a series of
sequential decisions (judgments), involving: (1) whether the
defendant's behavior caused the harm (the behavioral decision);
(2) whether the defendant suffered from a disability of mind at
117. Norman J. Finkel, The Insanity Defense: A Comparison of Verdict
Schemas, 15 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 533 (1991).
118. Caton F. Roberts et al., Verdict Selection Processes in Insanity Cases: Juror
Construals and the Effects of Guilty But Mentally Ill Instructions, 17 LAw & HUM.
BEtrAv., 261, 271 (1993).
119. Id. at 273.
120. Norman J. Finkel & Christopher Slobogin, Insanity, Justification, and
Culpability: Toward a Unifying Schema, 19 LAw & Hum. BEhiv. 447 (1995).
121. FINKEL, supra note 24, at 293-98.
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the moment of the act (the mens decision), and, further, whether
it was partial or total; (3) whether the defendant was culpable to
some degree for bringing about the disability of mind (the culpa-
bility decision), and, further, to what degree (partial or total);
and (4) a traditional mens rea decision, if (2) and (3) are
answered "no"; these sequential decisions ultimately lead to a
verdict. 
122
This new test was compared against a traditional two-choice
test (IDRA), and the two three-choice tests (GBMI and DR) in a
subsequent experiment, where we found that the fewest NGRI
verdicts resulted when Finkel's schema was used, and that reduc-
tion was significant. But more than merely reducing a verdict,
Finkel's schema more tightly tracked subjects' ratings and deter-
minative constructs of the defendant, significantly more so than
any other schema.12 1 We know that subjects in the two- and
three-choice conditions are making similar culpability judgments
and invoking the same constructs as subjects in the sequential
verdict condition, but the subjects in the two- and three-choice
conditions do not have all the categories they need to register
their discriminations. Thus, they must squeeze and conflate into
one category. When you do so, you may get the appearance of a
"wrongful" verdict.
Finkel's "relative culpability" schema was empirically tested
in another experiment, this time against the two most widely
used traditional exculpatory tests - the ALl 124 and IDRA 125
122. Id. One begins with a behavioral decision of did the defendant's
behavior cause the harm that is a criminal offense by law. If a subject answers
"no," then a not guilty verdict follows. If they answer "yes," then they go to the
mens decision, where they answer whether the defendant, at the moment of the
act, was suffering from a disability of mind, and did that disability of mind play a
significant role in the defendant's criminal behavior. If subjects say "no," then
they go to the mens rea decision to consider traditional intent questions, that may
lead to a verdict of guilty, guilty to a lesser offense, or a verdict of not guilty.
But if the subject says "yes" to the mens question, then they decide if the
disability of mind at the moment of the act was partial or total. Then they go
on to consider the culpability decision as to whether the defendant was culpable
to some degree for bringing about her disability of mind. If they find
culpability, they must further decide if she is partially or totally culpable. With
this sequence of decisions, specific verdicts follow. In this schema, for someone
to be found NGRI, they would have to have a total disability of mind and also be
not culpable for bringing it about.
123. Put in terms of variance, this schema reduces more error variance
and better predicts verdicts than any other schema. As subjects are naturally
making different types of culpability judgments, and are naturally making
shading discriminations, this schema gives them the vehicle for registering
those discriminations.
124. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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tests. Finkel's schema was also tested against a "quasi-subjective
justification" (QSJ) test that extends the subjectivizing point of
view of the Model Penal Code,126 and seeks to situate "insanity"
with other defensive doctrines, such as self-defense, provocation,
and duress. The results of this second experiment were clear
and consistent with the first experiment. Only Finkel's test sig-
nificantly reduced insanity verdicts across the seven different case
vignettes used, resulting in less than half the percentage of NGRI
verdicts than ALI, IDRA, and QSJ. Moreover, the result was
obtained with college student subjects and law school student
subjects.127 In addition, when we subtlely manipulated the case
vignettes by adding a phrase that indicated that defendants were
culpable (a with culpability condition) for bringing about their
mental disorder (e.g., they drank, refused to take medication,
went off medication without doctor's consent, refused treat-
ment) - a manipulation that should have increased the guilty
verdict percentage over the condition that did not have the cul-
pability phrase ( the without culpability condition) - only Finkel's
schema registered increased guilt, whereas ALI, IDRA, and QSJ
did not
128
Further refining these results, we gave the with and without
culpability variations to two law school student samples, under a
"no test" condition. Overall, under "no test," their verdicts more
closely resembled the verdicts under Finkel's schema, than under
ALI, IDRA, and QSJ. Moreover, the subjects under the with cul-
pability phrase registered that fact, and it resulted in significantly
more guilty verdicts. These findings again suggest that Finkel's
test does track culpability distinctions that people quite naturally
see and weigh, and it gives them the schema to register them.
Finally, we tested whether liberalizing the manslaughter defini-
tion, using the MPC language, would capture more "guilty" ver-
dicts and reduce NGRI verdicts more simply than Finkel's
schema. While the MPC language slightly reduced NGRI ver-
dicts, it did not produce the dramatic and significant change that
Finkel's test did.
129
All of these experiments, with adults, college students, and
law school students, focus on different facets of the common-
sense perspective on insanity, and how it relates to or departs
from black-letter law's perspective, as embedded in traditional
legal tests. The implications of these findings are pragmatic and
126. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 20, at § 4.01.





practical, but they also bear on the conceptual and theoretical.
If the law seeks to eliminate "wrongful" verdicts and to set the
maddening matter of insanity right, it cannot ignore the jurors'
perspective for long; yet, in the long history of changing the
insanity test, that is precisely what has occurred, for the legal his-
tory is notable for the absence of that commonsense perspective.
In the absence of the commonsense perspective, we see test
after test failing to cure the ills it was created to correct. In show-
ing no significant difference in verdicts from its predecessor, the
new test turns out to be much ado about nothing. When these
new tests incorporate substantive standards out of the ether of
legal or psychological theory - standards that make little con-
tact with the jurors' intuitive constructs of sane and insane - we
repeatedly find that these new legal constructs fail to instruct. 
13
Maligning the jurors turns out to be the wrong answer. The
evidence is overwhelming that jurors' constructs are complex,
and that they make fine-grained discriminations. When the
jurors' constructs of "sane" and "insane" are elucidated, they
turn out to be deep: they go beneath the superficial symptoms of
insanity, the shallow cornerstones of so many legal tests, to an
essence that lies in the capacity to make responsible choices.
They also consider and weigh a dimension akin to negligence or
recklessness, which has been notably absent or conflated in
insanity law: culpability for bringing about one's disability of
mind.
Professor George Dix concluded that "the law, if it is to
maintain the community's respect, must grade its condemnation
according to the moral turpitude of the offender as the commu-
nity evaluates it."'3 ' The community does grade moral turpitude,
and when an insanity schema is created from commonsense dis-
tinctions, fewer NGRI verdicts, tighter variance, and a more faith-
ful tracking of culpabilityjudgments results. When the law's path
is constructed from legalisms unchecked by realism, commonsense
justice does not follow. If the law followed the path of common-
sense justice, that path leads neither into darkness nor madness,
but back to familiar legal terrain.' 32 On this ground, intelligible
and defensible culpability distinctions provide a moral footing
for this maddening matter of insanity. The law can do worse.
And it has.
130. Finkel & Fulero, supra note 25, at 257-58.
131. George E. Dix, Psychological Abnormality as a Factor in Grading Criminal
Liability: Diminished Capacity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Like, 62 J.CRIM.L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 313, 332 (1971).
132. FINKEL, supra note 1, at 337.
1996]
46 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 10
IV. WHERE MANSLAUGHTER RULES, COMMONSENSE REIGNS
In mitigating the crime and the punishment, the law treats
manslaughter differently than either felony-murder, where pun-
ishment is at full strength, or insanity, where the punishment is
nil. The law's mitigating rationale is found amidst the concepts
of provocation, emotion, time, reason, and action, and how they
are woven into an implicit theory of human nature. This theory
- which is at least as much a psychological theory as it is a legal
theory - drives manslaughter jurisprudence. From the very
same concepts and strands, ordinary people - who may come to
sit on juries and who do not necessarily grant the law hegemony
here - have their own implicit theories of how provocations,
passions, reason, time, and action interweave, and why punish-
ment ought to be mitigated under certain conditions. In evaluat-
ing the law's theory, we need to see if it comports with or departs
from commonsense views.
A. Common Law Manslaughter 'Rules'
One rule abstracted from case law was that "mere words"
were not sufficient provocation to mitigate the crime to man-
slaughter.13 But this rule did not hold for all juries, M or even
all courts."3 5 Apart from exceptions which seemed to bend the
"mere words" rule; the rule would soon undergo mutation and
division, whereby "insults," regarded as insufficient, were split off
from "informational" words, which might be sufficient. An illus-
tration is Roy/ey1 6 where a boy ran to his father and informed
him that he had just been beaten by the victim. After running
one mile, the father found the boy who beat his son and killed
him with a cudgel. The court found that it was manslaughter
because the killing was "upon a sudden" - which brings time
into the equation as well as type and degree of provocation. But this
opinion is problematic for both provocation and time. First, the
133. Singer, supra note 19, at 253.
134. See Watts v. Byrnes, Noy 171, 74 Eng. Rep. 1129 (K.B.). In this
sixteenth century case, where the victim gave the defendant a wry face, and the
defendant then stabbed the victim from behind, the jury first brought in a
manslaughter verdict; the judge then imprisoned the jury and directed them to
return a murder verdict, which they eventually did.
135. See also Williams, Jones, W. 432, 82 Eng. Rep. 227 (KB.). In this
case, two strangers met, and one insulted the defendant's Welsh heritage,
whereupon the defendant threw a hammer at him; the hammer missed the
intended victim but hit and killed a bystander. Here was an insult, plain and
simple, mere words leading to deadly violence, but the court held the
defendant guilty only of manslaughter.
136. Royley's Case, 2 Cro.Jac. 296, 79 Eng. Rep. 254 (1666).
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informational words that fired the father off seem to be a small
flame igniting an over-heated response: the father involved him-
self and his cudgel in a dispute between two boys. Second, on
the time matter, the "upon the sudden occasion" proved no such
thing: even if Royley was a world-class miler, he certainly needed
minutes to cover the one mile, minutes in which reason could
regain dominion over affect. Time and provocation, which physi-
cists, psychologists, and ordinary citizens are apt to treat as rela-
tive and subjective, are herein treated as objective by the law. But
even if we grant the law its objective perspective, the informa-
tional-words rule, and the rule about time, were about to conflict
with another of iis objective rules, this one regarding adultery.
In flagrante delicto cases are prototypes for most people of
what constitutes "crimes of passion."1"7 "No 'rule' of adequate
provocation was more firmly entrenched, even by the end of the
eighteenth century, than that which proclaimed that a spouse (a
husband, of course) who found his wife in bed with a lover, and
killed one or both of them, was entitled to a reduction to man-
slaughter.""3 ' Yet this well-established "rule" had qualifiers: only
adultery could be adequate provocation, and just a suspicion of
adultery was insufficient. Still, even with qualifiers, the rule was
already bent in Maddy's Case." 9
Maddy did not catch the act with his eyes, but with his ears,
hearing informational words about an adulterous act. It cannot
be just a seeing versus hearing distinction, for Royley's Case contra-
venes. If Royley and Maddy both saw the provocative act, then
manslaughter's mitigation is granted; but when Royley hears of
the beating and Maddy hears of the adultery, only Maddy loses.
Along these lines, one can infer that if a blind man hears the
unmistakable sounds of his wife's flagrante, and kills, he would
lose, where a seeing husband would not. If "blind justice" fails
the blind husband, this division between informational words -
beatings or adultery - fails to add up.
Of all the rules abstracted by commentators to define the
parameters of manslaughter, the rule regarding time - killing
137. See e.g., Regina v. Smith, 4 Fost & F 1066 (1866), 176 Eng. Rep. 910;
State v. John, 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) 330 (1848); Paulin v. State, 21 Tex. Crim. 436, 1
S.W. 453 (1886); Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1863). I have cited not the
typical flagrante cases, where the spouse catches the other spouse in the act with
the lover, for those cites would no doubt fill volumes, and return us to the dawn
of time, which is slightly beyond the scope of this paper. More interesting, I
submit, are the atypical flagrante cases, like those cited above, where the
defendant hears of the infidelity, but does not catch the act with his own eyes.
138. Singer, supra note 19, at 256.
139. Maddy's Case, 1 Vent. 158, 86 Eng. Rep. 108 (1672).
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"upon a sudden," in the heat of passion - seems almost axio-
matic, yet no less problematic than other rules. The logic of this
rule rests on considering the alternative: if the killing was not
upon a sudden, but occurred after a cooling off period, it was
then assumed that the actor's blood and passions had cooled, his
reason had been restored to its full apprehending and inhibiting
strength, and full culpability and punishment should follow.
It was also assumed that the question of how much time
must pass for cooling to occur was an objective question, one to be
decided by the court rather than by the jury."4 The assumption
that "time" (1) inevitably cools passion, and (2) can be objec-
tively determined by the courts, leaves two sorts of defendants in
the murderous cold - "brooders" and "rekindlers." Consider
literature's consummate brooder, Hamlet, who starts and stops,
hems and haws, and finally, in Act V, does the deed he was given
to do in Act I. Now consider State v. Gounagias."4 As Singer sum-
marizes the case,
[t]he defendant, a Greek immigrant, had purposely killed
the deceased. He sought to introduce evidence that he
had been sodomized by the deceased and that for the next
three weeks, the defendant's friends, who had learned
about the incident from the deceased, taunted him. The
Washington Supreme Court held that this evidence had
been properly excluded from the trial because, while the
defendant might in fact have killed in passion, it was not
"of a sudden." 14 2
The Court offers an even more curious psychological "theory" to
justify this decision.
This theory of the cumulative effect of reminders of former
wrongs . . . is contrary to the idea of sudden anger as
understood in the doctrine of mitigation. In the nature of
the thing, sudden anger cannot be cumulative. A provoca-
tion which does not cause instant resentment, but which is
only resented after being thought upon and brooded over,
is not a provocation sufficient in law to reduce intentional
killing from murder to manslaughter .... 14 3
This proposition seems inconsistent with what we know from
psychology, and with what common sense tells us about ordinary
relationships. Adults who have suffered abuse in childhood, be it
physical and/or sexual, may strongly react in the "heat of pas-
140. Singer, supra note 19, at 276.
141. 88 Wash. 304, 153 P. 9 (1915).
142. Singer, supra note 19, at 279.
143. State v. Gounagias, 88 Wash. 304, 153 P. 9, 14 (1915).
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sion" in adulthood; others, traumatized by war, rape, and many
other human and natural disasters, may suffer rekindling, flash-
backs, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which can fea-
ture sudden, passionate, even violent reactions to stimuli that
normally do not evoke such responses. "Normal" individuals
who have no diagnostic label often react long after the provoca-
tion has faded.
Brooders and rekindlers come together in that some new
spark, be it internal or external, ignites an old flame. A legal
theory that denies what seems fundamental about human nature
risks losing support. The law seems to be embracing a stimulus-
response simplism - a view that provocations always produce
intense anger on the spot, and then they "die," becoming insuffi-
cient to trigger intense anger that is not premeditated revenge.
For the Washington Court to tell Gounagias that the sodomy he
suffered was over and done with, and that the subsequent taunts
were insufficient by themselves, and, finally, that the sodomy and
the taunts do not go together or connect in any way - seems prepos-
terous. Such a legalism artificially keeps connected events in rig-
idly separate compartments; this compartmentalization, which
would be clinically diagnostic to psychologists, will be rejected by
laymen, who are imprisoned by no such legal reasoning.
As Professor Singer puts it:
[A] system which precludes evidence of words which
actually enraged the defendant to the point of loss of self-
control, which precludes evidence of his victim's adultery
unless the defendant saw the physical act itself, . . . and
which views the question of cooling off as one of law rather
than of fact has, for all practical purposes, relegated the
defendant to the sidelines. The issue of his culpability has,
thus, been transformed into one to be measured by rules,
rather than by his actual mental state.
144
The "final objectification" - the "quintessential 'rule' of
objectivity - [is] the 'reasonable' or 'ordinary' man." 141 Yet this
average man standard may ill-fit the likes of Gounagias. The
ordinary person faced with taunts may not kill, but then the ordi-
nary person has not been sodomized three weeks earlier. When
individual variability is left out of the legal equation with only the
mythical exemplar being considered, then the actual defendant
becomes "persona non grata" at his own trial.'46 This is what
happened to a young man, a Britisher named Bedder, who
144. Singer, supra note 19, at 280.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 262.
1996]
50 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 10
sought out a prostitute on the hope (to put it crudely) that he
would get "screwed." His hope was not realized in the brothel,
for his impotence was his undoing, but he got more than he bar-
gained for in court. In Bedder v. Director of Public Prosecutions,147
the "ordinary person" exemplar held in the end, rather than a
standard more subjectivized and tailored to the impotent Bed-
der; thus, when the objective law was rendered, the law, like the
defendant, was impotent.
Bedder, a seventeen-year-old, was told by a doctor that he
was impotent; nonetheless, he hired a prostitute in a desperate
hope that he might be able to perform. When he could not, the
prostitute taunted and ridiculed Bedder, and he killed her in a
rage. But in the instructions to the jury, instructions the House
of Lords affirmed, Bedder's impotence was declared irrelevant,
and the jury was told not to consider this fact. As Professor
George Fletcher notes, we "can hardly say that the jury passed
judgment on Mr. Bedder if they did not consider the most signif-
icant facts that influenced his loss of control." 1" "In effect, this
meant that the legal issue to be decided by the jury was whether a
reasonably potent man would have been incensed to the point of
killing by taunts regarding his impotence. The question, of
course, was silly ...."-'
B. The Law Takes a Subjective Plunge
The Bedder decision was promptly attacked, and three years
later, via the Homicide Act of 1957, a subjective turn was taken,
as the jury was now to consider everything done and said. In the
United States, the Model Penal Code introduced "extreme
mental or emotional disturbance," which was to be judged "from
the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the cir-
cumstances as he believes them to be."150 This turns the ques-
tion into a subjective inquiry. The objective reign had ended,
and the law's subjective about-face put it on a path closer to com-
monsense justice. This may be an instance of Roscoe Pound's
prediction, that when there is a "divergence between the stan-
dard of the common law and the standard of the public, it goes
without saying that the latter will prevail in the end.""15
In making a subjective veer, the Model Penal Code drafters
not only shifted toward the direction common sense justice had
147. 1 W.L.R. 1119 (1954).
148. Fletcher, supra note 37, at 248.
149. Singer, supra note 19, at 289.
150. MPC, supra note 20.
151. Pound, supra note 11, at 615.
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been taking all along, but went even further. In its "extreme
mental or emotional disturbance" (EED) concept, the Code
ended up severing all ties to objective reality. The problem with
the EED standard is illustrated in two Connecticut cases, State v.
Zdanis52 and State v. Elliott,'53 both of which dealt with "brood-
ers" who killed victims without a provocative act by the victim.
.The appellate court in Zdanis made it clear that "virtually any
reaction to any stimulus may be considered in an EED jurisdic-
tion,"154 and the appellate court in Elliott went even further:
The defense [of EED] does not require a provoking or trig-
gering event; or that the homicidal act occur immediately
after the cause or causes of the defendant's extreme emo-
tional disturbance . . . .A homicide influenced by an
extreme emotional disturbance is not one which is neces-
sarily committed in the "hot blood" stage, but rather one
that was brought about by a significant mental trauma that
caused the defendant to brood for a long period of time
and then react violently, seemingly without provocation.
55
The appellate courts' dicta is good news for the brooder, but
bad news for the law. This EED construal reflects a naive and
outdated subjectivity, where mental entities float about in the
mind. In this sort of subjective law, as in this sort of mind, there
exists a disembodied and disconnected EED, severed from its
nexus to provocation on the front end, untied to control and
action on the back end, yet producing mayhem, murder, and
manslaughter in its wake. And if we are prepared to grant this
EED alien such autonomy, it will surely claim mitigation as its
due.
The MPC drafters, mindful that the objective rules for man-
slaughter had failed, turned, correctly it would seem, toward the
subjective. This turn held the promise of greater alignment with
commonsense justice and held out greater hope for doctrinal
consistency. But while the direction was appropriate, the chosen
path may not have been. This exclusively subjective path - a
solipsistic slide into extreme emotional disturbance that
deadends in a dark mind - remains problematic. Throwing the
issue to jurors under these conditions may produce commonsen-
sical rough justice despite the vagaries, or it might promote
vague and disparate verdicts.
152. 182 Conn. 388, 391-97, 438 A.2d 696, 698-701 (1980).
153. 177 Conn. 1, 411 A.2d 3 (1979).
154. Singer, supra note 19, at 295 (regarding State v. Zdanis).
155. Id. at 295; State v. Elliot, supra note 134, at 7-8, 411 A.2d at 8.
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C. The Community's Subjectivity, with Objective Anchors
In an experimental format, mock jurors confront the mur-
der versus manslaughter question in two benchmark cases: Bed-
de?156 and Gounagias.15 7 Certain case variables were manipulated
to see the effects on verdicts, sentences, and subjects' reasons for
their decisions. The general questions were these: How would
varying the type and degree of provocation, the type of emotion
engendered, the history of the actor, the context of the act, and
the cooling-off time, affect verdicts and sentences in these
brooder and rekindler scenarios? And would the subjects' com-
monsense reasons for their verdicts match, or depart from, the
legal rules regarding manslaughter?
Subjects 5 8 were given two cases, variants of Bedder and
Gounagias, called State v. Bedder and New Mexico v. Cooper, in ran-
dom order. In Bedder, the variables of context, provocation, and
emotion were manipulated. For context, one variation closest to
the actual Bedder case reveals that the seventeen-year-old Bedder
was told by several doctors that he was impotent, with the cause
being physical and not correctable; in the second variation, the
subjects were told that Bedder could not perform the sexual act
with the prostitute, but they were not told of the; impotence
factor.
The second variable involved provocation, and there were two
levels: the prostitute laughs and taunts Bedder, or she slaps Bed-
der in addition to laughing and taunting. The final variable was
the type of emotion that Bedder claimed and displayed: in one vari-
ation, Bedder became enraged when the prostitute either taunted
or slapped him, and after he repeatedly stabbed her and then
fled, another customer and prostitute testify that they saw Mr.
Bedder looking enraged; in the second version, Bedder claimed
that he became frightened when the prostitute started taunting or
slapping, and when he fled, the others testify that he looked
scared. The question here is: Will subjects be more sympathetic
to the emotion of fear as opposed to anger, and will fear lead to
more manslaughter verdicts?
In the Cooper case, though there were eight conditions, the
size of the defendant and victim is held constant: Cooper is a 37-
year-old man, who stands 5'3" and weighs 118 pounds, while the
30-year-old Santiago stands 6'4" and weighs 265 pounds. The
first condition parallels the Gounagias fact pattern, where Santi-
ago sodomizes Cooper one night, and Cooper leaves the restau-
156. Supra note 147.
157. Supra note 141.
158. There were 95 college students serving as subjects.
COMMONSENSE JUSTICE
rant angry and humiliated. For the next three weeks, Santiago
repeatedly taunts Cooper, who finally picks up a knife and stabs
Santiago to death following the last taunt. While this version rep-
resents a rekindling case, it is called "frequent rekindling," since
the taunts occur often. A second version tests the effect of only
one rekindling (taunting) episode. The third version tests
brooding versus rekindling: here, Cooper returns to the restau-
rant after three weeks, but Santiago makes no taunts, yet Cooper
picks up the knife and stabs Santiago. If the brooder case is per-
ceived more like a premeditated murder than a rekindling case,
we would expect harsher verdicts and stiffer sentences.
The essential feature of either rekindling or brooding is that
time has passed between the provocation (e.g., the sodomy) and
the killing, time for the blood to cool and malice aforethought to
form. In the next two conditions, we manipulated time by
expanding or shrinking it. In condition four, Cooper returns to
the restaurant six months later to pick up his last check, Santiago
taunts him, and then Cooper kills; the time interval has now
expanded to six months. In the fifth condition "time" shrinks to
zero: this becomes a heat of passion case, where Cooper kills
immediately after being sodomized, and this serves as a control
group for the rekindling and brooding cases.
There is still another control group which leaves in the taunt
but takes out the sodomy: here, in the sixth condition, Cooper is
not sodomized but kills after Santiago makes certain taunting
comments which Cooper alleges brought back hurtful memories
from his past. This condition should yield the fewest manslaugh-
ter verdicts, if the sodomy is indeed the crucial provocation. If
the sodomy is irrelevant, as the Gounagias court claimed, then the
verdicts and sentences in this case should look like the rekindling
case, as both defendants kill immediately after a taunt.
The last two conditions push context even further. In both
cases, the defense presents historical evidence that Cooper was
raised by a physically abusive father; thus when the sodomy
occurs Cooper's slate and psyche are not blank, but already sensi-
tized, like Bedder was sensitized by his impotence. Now we will
see if jurors widen context still further to include evidence from
the distant past. In condition seven, there is history of physical
abuse, then the sodomy, then the rekindling taunt three weeks
later, and then the killing. In condition eight, there is history of
abuse, sodomy, and a brooder who sees the victim three weeks
later, and kills.
The results reveal that Bedder produces significantly more
second degree murder verdicts and fewer manslaughter verdicts
than Cooper. Approximately two-thirds of the verdicts in Bedder
19961
54 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 10
were second degree murder, whereas slightly more than half the
verdicts were voluntary manslaughter in Cooper. In Bedder,
neither context (impotence versus no impotence), nor provoca-
tion (laugh versus slap), nor emotion (fear versus anger) pro-
duce a significant effect on verdict. In contrast, the Cooper case
reveals a number of significant differences. First, in what was not
obvious to the Gounagias court but was to these mock jurors, the
sodomy makes a difference: when there is no sodomy but only a
taunt, the voluntary manslaughter verdicts are the lowest; when
the sodomy occurs and Cooper kills in the heat of passion, volun-
tary manslaughter verdicts dramatically rise; and when the killing
occurs three weeks after the sodomy, following frequent rekin-
dling episodes or a single episode, manslaughter verdicts remain
high. A second significant difference is between brooding and
rekindling cases, with brooders being judged more harshly: the
rekindling cases average approximately 70% manslaughter ver-
dicts, whereas brooding cases average about 40%.
There are also surprising nonsignificant differences. For
one, time does not seem to matter. For example, there is no sig-
nificant difference between the immediate killing in the heat of
passion and the rekindling case where the killing occurs three
weeks later; in addition, there is no significant difference
between the three week and the six month rekindling cases.
Hence, "cooling off time," an issue so central for the courts,
seems moot for these mock jurors. Finally, the background con-
text was not significant. Thus, while sodomy is a central contex-
tual factor, the jurors limit the contextual field and give little
weight to distant past history.
"Verdict" is not the only measure of a defendant's "culpabil-
ity:" it is quite possible for two defendants to get the same verdict,
yetjurors judge one of them more blameworthy when it comes to
sentencing. Mock jurors had the option of sentencing defend-
ants to jail time - from "no time" up to "life imprisonment. "159
The sentences for the Bedder case reveal significant differences
for provocation and emotion. Sentences were lower when the prov-
ocation was a slap rather than a taunt, and sentences were lower
when the emotion was fear rather than anger.
The context effect turns out to be not significant; in fact,
sentences were higher in the impotence than in the no impo-
tence condition. Some jurors invoked the concepts of negli-
159. Our decision was not to restrain jurors' predilections by providing
sentencing ranges for the verdicts, so a more open sentencing format was used;
while this may yield sentences lower and higher than what a judge might give
using guidelines, what we get here is "community sentiment" unfettered.
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gence or recklessness in their reasons: they argued that Bedder
knew he was impotent and chose to put himself in a situation
where failure and provocation were all but inevitable; for this, he
bears additional culpability.
For Cooper, there was a large significant effect among the
eight conditions. Planned comparisons revealed that the one
condition where there was no sodomy received much higher
sentences than all of the sodomy cases. The brooder cases
received significantly higher sentences than either the rekindling
cases or the heat of passion case. There was no significant differ-
ence between the heat of passion condition and the rekindling
cases. As with verdict results, "time" does not seem to matter in
terms of sentences, as there were no significant differences
among six month rekindling, three week rekindling, and the
immediate, heat of passion killing. And again, distant context
had no effect on sentences.
The mock jurors' reasons for their decisions were catego-
rized and analyzed, with three clusters emerging. The first clus-
ter is called "intent versus emotion." This cluster represents the
essence of the legal debate. If emotion is great, it negates malice
aforethought, and if emotion is not great enough, intent to kill
may be present. In cluster two, provocation, threat, and control
cluster together, and is called "control." Jurors seem to be judg-
ing the degree of provocation, the sort of threat that might pose,
and the degree of control the defendant had. These factors
seem to be an admixture of objective and subjective factors: con-
trol seems more subjective, requiring an inference into what is
not observable, while provocation and threat can be viewed
either subjectively or objectively. Finally, the third cluster is
called the "subjective reasonable person." Here, the context fac-
tor, as in Bedder's impotence and Cooper's sodomy, plays a dom-
inant part. Context affects and subjectivizes "time," as rekindling
makes the past present, and subjectivizes the objective reasonable
person, for jurors see the drama through the subjective eyes of
the defendant, who did not premeditate. Thus, while objective
and subjective factors mix in differing ways, there is a decidedly
subjective caste, particularly so for the voluntary manslaughter
verdict jurors.
Mock jurors do not restrict their constructs and discrimina-
tions solely to the legally designated dimensions. In Bedder, the
legal fight was over whether jurors should hear about his impo-
tence. Our mock jurors who heard of his impotence were no
more inclined toward manslaughter than those who did not; yet
these jurors brought into play contributory negligence or
recklessness.
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In Bedder, while there was confirmation that a slap is ade-
quate provocation but a taunt is not, there was clear evidence
that jurors weigh the particular emotion - fear or anger - in
their sentencing decisions. This suggests that people are more
sympathetic to "scared" than "enraged," and further suggests that
it is notjust the heat of passion, but type of passion, that determines
verdict.
In Cooper, we have a number of disparities between what the
Gounagias court said and did, and with what mock jurors did and
said. First, where Gounagias was found guilty of second degree
murder, Cooper, in the rekindling case, gets manslaughter 85%
of the time. Beyond the sizable verdict difference is the reason
for the difference: mockjurors weigh the context of the sodomy
heavily, where the Gounagias court gave it no weight at all. In
doing so, mock jurors thus extend "'time" beyond the legal
"moment of the act." In a psychological sense, jurors shrink
"time," as the poet penned, such that "time past" now becomes
"time present." Yet, their "shrinking" of time was neither unre-
strained nor indiscriminant, for where they included the sodomy
they did not use the distant history of abuse to mitigate further.
Thus, "relevant context" is bounded, and does not extend, in
some fearful infinite regress, into ancient acts that wash all sins
away.
In bringing the sodomy into the context, a strong subjective
caste results. We cannot say, as we might of a rose, that "a taunt
is a taunt is a taunt." The provocation is subjective, determined
in part by the contextual history of the defendant, which then
affects attributions about how much emotion he is feeling, his
sense of threat, and his degree of control. Case facts are impor-
tant, yet the jurors' constructions are even more dispositive of ver-
dict. Facts, the objective ground, are construed and translated
into a subjective story, where psychological attributions and inter-
connections are made. This is illustrated in the different attribu-
tions made for the brooder and rekindler. For the brooder,
because there is not even a taunt at the moment of the deadly
act, mock jurors are more likely to construe premeditation or
malice aforethought. In contrast, the rekindler reacts to some-
thing in the external world - what the victim does or says.
Mock jurors understand that external, objective, and "real"
taunts can awaken sleeping passions, and their verdicts and rea-





Across the venues of accessory felony-murder, insanity, and
manslaughter, the paths of black-letter law and commonsensejustice
diverge regarding culpability, sometimes rather sharply. One
reason for divergence is context. At times, citizens frame cases in
ways that yield a different set of relevant factors and a different
overall "picture" than the law's construction. An easy generaliza-
tion, albeit an over-generalization, is this: the commonsense con-
text is typically wider than the law's.
This wider view is taken in regard to current context, where
jurors weigh more factors than the law's sanctioned elements in
cases of accessory felony-murder, insanity, and manslaughter.
This wider view extends backward and forward in time, thereby
giving a different historical context to the drama at bar. Where
the law seems to freeze the frame at the moment of the act, and
then zooms in on a specific set of determinative variables, the
commonsense context, like a motion picture, conveys actions
before, during, and even after the moment of the act.
"Freezing the frame" may produce high resolution, when it
comes to still pictures, but it can produce absurdity when it
comes to justice, as the failed "manslaughter" cases of Bedder'6°
and Gounagias16 ' illustrate. Had Gounagias picked up a weapon
immediately and killed his sodomizer, this heat of passion and
"of a sudden" reaction surely would have resulted in manslaugh-
ter; but by waiting, by brooding, by letting time pass, the legal
moment of the act passes into the future, as the sodomy fades
into the legally irrelevant past. Now, after three weeks of taunts
by the deceased and his friends, Gounagias picks up a weapon
and kills. If the killing defines the relevant "moment of the act,"
then the provocation is no longer the sodomy but the taunts; yet
taunts per se, by an objective rule that deems "mere words" insuffi-
cient as a provocation, will not mitigate the crime to manslaugh-
ter.162 In a narrow context that begins with a taunt and ends with
a death - the most important "fact" - the sodomy - is not
even in play.
In the law's frozen moment, high-resolution portrayal,
events occur in time, rather than in mind: in time, events begin,
end, and then they are no more; in mind, subjective events have a
mental and emotional half-life that may linger long after the
160. Bedder v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, 1 W.L.R. 1119 (1954).
161. State v. Gounagias, 88 Wash. 304, 153 P. 9 (1915).
162. Singer, supra note 19.
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objective event has gone. If jurors are instructed to take in time
view, and they follow that instruction, can it be said that they
really pass judgment on Gounagias?
To commonsense justice, the sodomy may be in play
because some view it as the provocation, despite what the law says,
and despite the fact that it occurred weeks earlier; in this view,
time is more relative, subjective, and psychological, rather than
fixed and immutable, but it also represents ajury nullification, as
jurors would be rejecting the legal conditions for judging man-
slaughter. In a second way that the sodomy can be in play, there
is no nullification per se, rather, the sodomy is seen as part of the
relevant context, giving meaning to the current provocation of
taunts. In this view, jurors may reason that the deceased and his
friends were not taunting "the ordinary person" who had not
been sodomized; they were taunting Gounagias, who had been.
This view personalizes and subjectivizes the actor and the action.
To treat taunts a-contextually and objectively is to take the sub-
jective and psychological out of the human judgment, and to
take the person of Gounagias out of the picture. This would
yield a stimulus-response simplism which reduces stimuli to
objective and invariate properties, which in turn produce
responses that fit the preordained category of manslaughter, or
not. Where Gounagias omits a relevant act from the context, Bed-
der omits a relevant personal fact, his impotence. This element of
Bedder's personal history may well be relevant to how Bedder
reacts to "mere word" taunts. In a legal view that circumscribes
context to the moment of the act, the past may not matter; in
such a stimulus-response matrix, the history and context may be
omitted. But to commonsense justice, this less-than-human way of
judging human actions, intentions, and culpability is rejected.
When black-letter law arbitrarily foreshortens context, it cre-
ates a resticted causal or culpability matrix as well. In dramatic
terms, the law's context is limited to the climax and denoue-
ment, that place on Freitag's Triangle 6 ' where the deadly resolu-
163. JOHN BARTH, LOST IN THE FUNHOUSE 91 (1969). "Freitag's Triangle,"
probably named by a literary rather than literal type, is not actually a triangle,
for this schemata often is pictured with four lines, or three lines that do not
touch and close at three points. Beginning with a horizontal line, this
represents the opening or exposition of the story. Then the line slopes up,
indicating the development of plot, characters, and dramatic action, and this
"rising action" line continues up to the dramatic high point, where the climax
occurs. Then the line plunges downward, at a sharp slope, as the climax is
resolved in the denouement. Using this diagram, the "crime" and moment of
the act occur at the high point, and the court case that resolves the drama
occurs during the denouement.
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tion of the conflict occurs. Within the dramatic analogue, the
law omits the exposition, the beginnings of the conflict, the rise
in the action, and how complication occurs in the development
of the conflict leading to the climax. By contrast, commonsense
justice typically widens the context to embrace the full-blown
drama. People want to know what happened before the act, and
to understand the actions, motives, and emotions that pushed
the drama to this point. In short, they want to know the story, and,
in that regard, a fuller context is essential.
Widening the context does run risks. For one, neatly drawn
distinctions between criminal law and civil law may blur. Yet, as
Kalven and Zeisel 64 noted some time ago, jurors do not fully
embrace this distinction, and often view the culpability context as
embracing both victim and defendant. This is particularly so
when victim and defendant know one another, as in a heat of
passion situation, where jurors are likely to be weighing the
actions and intentions of both parties. So if the victim's provoca-
tions were flagrant, yet short of sticks and stones, jurors may miti-
gate the defendant's culpability, even if it does not precisely fit
the manslaughter rules.
From the law's perspective, jurors' parsing culpability
among participants is not what the law asks; to do so might bring
extralegal and impermissible factors into play. That may be true
from the legal context, but from the commonsense view, this is a
social drama, and to extract one of the parties from the social
web and then isolate the analysis on this individual's actions and
intentions exclusively, seems contrived. Much may be lost in
such a translation.
Black-letter law might well argue, as Holmes 165 did, that its
business is not God's business: instead of judging all, it only
judges the one who allegedly broke the law. When jurors stray
from the sole function of judging the individual to parsing and
apportioning blame, justice will suffer. If the law artifically iso-
lates on a person, an act, and a finite period of time, it does so in
order to make a "cleaner" culpability judgment. But if the claim
is that a wider context produces a "messy" and less distinct culpa-
bility judgment, some lessons from insanity contravene this
claim.
In insanity, commonsense justice widens the law's context to
consider a second type of culpability - for bringing about the
mental disorder. While adding complexity, this type of culpabil-
ity is consistent with the law in other venues, where causing the
164. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 6.
165. HOLMES, supra note 10.
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conditions of one's own defense is properly weighed. It is also
consistent with attributions of responsibility in social judgments.
Thus, it might be said that commonsensejustice brings into the con-
text not an extralegal factor, but a legal one that has been over-
looked or conflated in the law's narrowness.
B. Subjectivity and Idiography
If context defines the contours of the field and the factors in
play, then perspective concerns the point of view we take when
regarding those factors. The outsider versus insider, or objectiv-
ity versus subjectivity, dilemma continues to bedevil legal the-
ory.166 Where black-letter has been divided, commonsense justice
consistently seems to take a more subjective perspective.
In The Common Law,'67 Holmes sought to situate the law in
the objective sphere: law works, he said, "within the sphere of
the senses"1 68 and remains "wholly indifferent to the internal
phenomena of conscience." The subjective realm that so capti-
vates novelists is of no concern to the law, says Holmes; subtext is
for the literary, not the legal, as "the standards of the law are
external standards."'
69
In trying to make his objective jurisprudence work, Holmes
denudes terms like "malice" of motive and feeling, leaving a dry
cognition that certain consequences will follow. By invoking the
"reasonable man" exemplar, Holmes avoids a subjective inquiry
into what this defendant knew, for it is enough to know that the
prototype would have known. Holmes noted that the law makes
no "attempt to see men as God sees them.""'0 Whether God
would approve or not of Holmes' creation, we cannot say; but
what we can say is that ordinary citizens do not see men as
Holmes saw them. His tour deforce falls flat, as commonsense justice
rejects such extreme objectivism.
In creating a story of what happened and why, jurors seem
quite comfortable in "dropping into" the shoes of the defendant
and looking at the events subjectively. More than just comfort,
the subjective view seems necessary to make an adjudication. For
jurors to construct a story that makes sense, that story must expli-
cate the motive and intentions of the actor; here, jurors plunge
166. FLETcHER, supra note 37, § 3.1.2; while a page cite is given, this
objective versus subjective theme and dilemma runs throughout this important
work.
167. HoLMEs, supra note 10, at 43.
168. Id. at 110.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 108.
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into the subjective waters rather than remaining on dry land,
with prototypic answers.
More than just subjectivity, there is idiography: jurors look
at each defendant's culpability, rather than treating culpability en
masse. This preference is most clear in cases where the accesso-
rial liability and felony-murder rules conjoin, where these rules
yield equalist culpability. Yet over and over again, subjects reject
these objective rules, and evaluate each defendant's intentions
and actions. Where black-letter law sees felons as fungible -
jurors see them as individuals, with their own levels of culpability,
which requires an idiographic assessment, despite the law's
directions.
For commonsense justice, "intent" is the cornerstone of culpa-
bility, far more than objective acts or rules. Unlike Holmes'
deconstructionist, constructionist, and minimalist treatment of
intent, commonsense justice not only gives intent centrality, but
dresses it with layers of emotion, motive, and meaning that leave
intent far removed from the denuded, skeletal remains of
Holmes' objective prototype. When the law erects formal rules,
restricts the view to the objective, or props up a prototype to
answer the question, the law runs counter to the jurors' powerful
and prevailing subjectivity and idiography. "Intent" - when it is
neither denuded in a Holmesian way nor formally pulled from a
hat in the legal legerdemain called felony-murder - is
subjective.
"Subjectivity" often arouses a countervailing fear - anarchy.
Will jurors lose their way amidst the subjective and, more impor-
tantly, will the law lose its way? We have some evidence on this,
at least for the specific areas of insanity, accessory felony-murder,
and manslaughter. If jurors yielded entirely to the subjective,
then insanity cases where delusional beliefs trigger the act would
have a high acquittal rate; yet we know that NGRI acquittals are
rare. In accessory felony-murder cases, accessories are routinely
found guilty, but not for murder. And in manslaughter, where
brooder versus rekindler differences were found, jurors seem to
demand that provocations occur in reality, and not just in the
mind. Jurors, then, are not yielding entirely to the subjective.
The subjective element, mens rea, turns out to have more
nuance for citizens than for the black-letter law. When jurors see
more shades to mens rea than the law either sees or sanctions,
these distinctions with a difference can create a verdict problem.
A dramatic example of shades to mens rea is in accessory felony-
murder, where jurors see nuance just where the law asks them
not to. When subjects are asked to determine mens rea, they do
so for each defendant - by considering all that was done, against
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what might have been done. Rejecting formulaic determinations
of mens rea, subjects balk at transferring the intent from one
crime to another, and outright rebel at transferring the intent
from one defendant to another. Determining intent is individu-
alized, and thus the law's biblical foray into making felons their
brother's keepers and equal-time cellmates, is rejected.
But what happens when jurors find some culpability, but not
the specific intent for the offense charged, and there is no lesser
included offense? In short, what ifjurors are confronted with an
all-or-nothing situation? Insanity has been just such an all-or-
nothing situation for over two hundred years. And while the law
presents jurors with this black-or-white picture, empirical evi-
dence shows that subjects see shadings. "Diminished responsibil-
ity" is one shade that falls between "completely culpable" and
"not culpable at all." Another shading involves culpability for
bringing about one's mental condition, which subjects recognize
but the law does not. When the law's verdict categories conflate
two distinct culpability judgments people make, or conflate gray
into either black or white, the verdict may appear wrongful. Yet
that is far different from concluding that the jurors arrived at the
wrong verdict.
The problem of too few categories cuts across a wide swath
of criminal law.171 In manslaughter, we see the same problem
again, even though manslaughter itself can be viewed as an in-
between culpability verdict. But when manslaughter is bound
tightly to the provocation and a response that must be "of a sud-
den," then brooders and rekindlers are not only out in the cold,
but entrapped by a murder conviction. But being bumped up to
murder may not fit this defendant's mens rea; if jurors can see a
difference between the murderer's mens rea and this defendant's,
then the problem of too few categories arises again. Ignore the
difference and follow the law, reconstrue the categories to create
some defacto fit, or nullify, seem to be the unenviable choices.
171. In self-defense law, for example, where the area of "mistaken or
putative self-defense" remains a theoretical backwater, we see that a defendant
who makes a mistake can be in very deep water. If we require a defendant
pleading self-defense to meet an objective set of prequisites, then a defendant's
mistaken belief that there existed a serious threat when there was none may
doom the defense. But a consequence is that jurors are then asked to regard
the defendant as a murderer; since there was no objective threat, hence no
"provocation," manslaughter is not a likely fit. But neither is the crime of
second or first degree murder likely to fit the case of mistaken self-defense.
What do jurors do with such a defendant when the verdict categories do not fit?
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C. Proportionality
Mens rea and culpability are measured, and the measure for
measure turns out to be proportionality. The verdict and sentenc-
ing evidence suggest that people must be invoking some sort of
blameworthiness scale when a task, like judging guilt or setting a
sentence, calls for it. Moreover, the evidence suggests that these
individualized blameworthiness scales must comport rather
closely, since verdicts and sentences, while not uniform, do align
to a significant degree. We see the principle of proportionality
being invoked when jurors try to find a mitigating verdict,
attempting to match a verdict to the blameworthiness they per-
ceive. In insanity or diminished responsibility cases, subjects try
to find the right equation for this defendant, invoking a contex-
tual scale on which they will situate this defendant below the
more culpable and above the less culpable.
The potency of proportionality can be seen most dramatically
in situations where the law tries to forbid it, as in accessory fel-
ony-murder where the law asks jurors to treat the principal and
all accessories equally; in capital cases, that might mean death
sentences for all. Yet time and again subjects cast aside equalism
in favor of proportional treatment of defendants. This is not just
an adult phenomenon, for in experimental work with children
on felony-murder-like scenarios we see how deeply and early pro-
portionality reigns.
If a punishment does appear to violate the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition, the Supreme Court may strike it down. But
we have seen that commonsense justice, working through the jurors
who are the conscience of the community, can exercise their
judgments on crime and punishment, on mens rea and culpabil-
ity, and what proportionately fits; and where the law's path and
the community's path part company, commonsense justice can
express its own check and balance, through a variety of nullifica-
tions, to register its corrective.
While commonsense justice does not command the "truth," it
nonetheless demands respect: not because it is anarchy waiting
to happen, but because it invokes just those sacred precepts of
justice embedded in mens rea and proportionality. Rooted in a
legal history far older than our Constitution, the jury, the con-
science of the community, speaks: it decides guilt, and some-
times the life-or-death fate of a defendant. Jurors may not have
the right to decide the law in most states, though they certainly
have the power to nullify in all states. That power has been
endorsed and condemned, seen as justice and as anarchy, but in
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the end jury discretion remains an established and affirmed fix-
ture within the law.
When put under an "experimental" microscope across a
number of legal venues, the context and perspective that jurors
take seem solid, substantial, and sound. Its moral groundings are
rooted in mens rea and the principle of proportionality, roots that
have clutched at our law for centuries. Citizens apprehend a
depth to wm rea, but also perceive its nuances, and when they
see distinctions worth making rather than ignoring, they will try
to register these distinctions. . . somehow. They also make pro-
portional distinctions among types of crimes and criminals, and
attempt to fit punishment to blameworthiness. Mens rea and pro-
portionality already constitute a well-worn path within black-let-
ter law. In calling the law to listen to the community's sentiment
and to see its path, this is not a call to the law to heed unprinci-
pled sentiment or follow some dead end; rather, it is a call to
hear what the law may have forgotten or lost sight of - the
deeper roots ofjustice.
